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 Abstract 
This paper is a strategic analysis for ABC Holdings, a family run multi-unit Dairy 
Queen in a small Northern Canadian city.  An industry analysis of the fast food industry 
in Canada is conducted as well as an in-depth examination of International Dairy Queen.  
An external analysis in the form of Porter’s Five Forces are utilized to determine the key 
success factors to identify the threats and opportunities available to the Dairy Queen.  An 
internal analysis of the DQ using the Diamond-E Framework investigates its management 
preferences, organization, and resources.  The internal capabilities of DQ are applied to 
provide recommendations for the owners and the future of the organization. 
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 1: Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze ABC Holding’s business situation and to 
evaluate the alternatives available to Jay Smith for the future of his company.  ABC 
Holdings is the parent company to two Dairy Queens (DQ) located in a small Canadian 
city of approximately 50,000 people.  A strategic analysis will also determine the options 
available to daughter Kim and the viability for her to take over the business.  A detailed 
analysis of the fast food industry in Canada and internal capabilities of the two Dairy 
Queen restaurants will also be considered.  A determination of the key success factors, 
opportunities and weaknesses will be identified and analyzed in comparison to the two 
Dairy Queens’ competitors.  Furthermore, strategic alternatives will be investigated and a 
decision will be made dependent upon management preferences and capabilities.   
1.1  Fast Food Industry Overview 
The purpose of this section is to assess the overall Canadian fast food industry and 
determine the factors that influence and shape it.  A review of current Canadian 
demographic and population changes, economic situation, as well as Canadian’s health 
trends and dining habits are covered.  The goal is to illustrate the broad industry in which 
DQ competes.       
1.1.1 Canadian Demographics 
It is important for companies to be aware of what target market they are catering 
to and the size of the demographics.  The fast food industry is a mature industry that is no 
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 longer rapidly growing; therefore, restaurants compete heavily for its customers.  
According to Euromonitor (2009), the expected population growth for Canada is 
estimated to be around 0.90 percent.  At this projected growth rate, Canada’s total 
population will be 36.7 million people by 2020.  As the population study below in Figure 
1:1 reveals the older generation (age 65+) or baby boomers will jump from size of 3.3 
million (9.4 percent of the total population) in 1980 to over 9.4 million people or 18.7 
percent of Canadians by 2020.  This age group is projected to account for 13.6 percent of 
Canadians total gross income by 2015.  Middle-aged adults between the ages of 40 to 64 
years old will comprise of 34 percent of all Canadians by 2020 and will command a 
significant 50.7 percent of the nation’s total gross income (Euromonitor International, 
2009).  The aging population will clearly have a significant impact on spending trends 
and the focus of the foodservice industry.   
1.1.2 Economic Recession 
Since mid 2008, the global economy has suffered from a widespread recession.  
The Canadian government has projected a $50.2 billion deficit from 2009 to 2010as of 
2008.   The government has taken several temporary measures under Canada’s Economic 
Action Plan to help stabilize the economy by supporting the job market.  These measures 
include an Employment Insurance enhanced work- sharing feature, a Home Renovation 
Tax Credit and infrastructure projects.  As a result, the Canadian economy was less 
affected in comparison to other G7 countries.   
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 Figure 1:1  Population Age Shift 2000 and 2020, Each Column Represents a Single Age 
Group1 
 
 
Figure 1:2 below shows Canada’s GDP fell by 2.2 percent since the second 
quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009 (Canada’s Economic Action Plan, 2009).  
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the worldwide economy is in a 
state of severe recession with massive financial crisis and loss of confidence.    Canada’s 
economic situation however is not as severe as the United States since the Canadian 
banking system is characterized by a more stable and regulated system with its low 
leverage ratios and high capital adequacy ratios (Canada’s Economic Action Plan, 2009).   
 
 
                                                     
1 Euromonitor International. (2009). Future Demographic – Canada. Retrieved June 12, 2009 from 
http://www.euromonitor.com  
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  Figure 1:2 Change in Real GDP 2008Q2 to 2009Q12 
 
 
1.1.3 Health Trends 
Health concerns are a significant factor for the aging Canadian demographic.  
Diseases such as obesity, diabetes, heart disease and high blood pressure 
characteristically plague this cohort of individuals.  These middle-aged adults and baby 
boomers control more than half of Canada’s discretionary income; therefore, there is an 
increased demand for fresh and healthier food.  It is logical that in order to remain 
profitable and competitive restaurants are evolving to cater to this demographic since the 
majority of the wealth and expendable spending resides within it.  Current trends are 
consistent for most fast food establishments to adopt healthier menu items such as salads, 
fruit/vegetable juice, subs and sandwiches.   
                                                     
2 Canada’s Economic Action Plan. (June 5, 2009). Economic Climate. Retrieved from 
http://www.actionplan.gc.ca/eng/feature.asp?pageId=114 
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 Updates and consistent menu changes are apparently due to the stakeholder 
pressures from consumers, government bodies, and health organizations.  The importance 
of offering fresh food, lower calorie alternatives and trans fat free foods are currently and 
will become more prominent.  For example, McDonald’s Canada offers a lighter choice 
menu that includes Chicken McGrill®, the Fruit ‘n Yogurt Parfait®, and several salad 
choices (McDonald’s, 2006).  Dairy Queen also has several salad options, grilled iron 
sandwiches and grilled chicken wraps.   
1.1.3.1 Trans Fat Concerns 
According to Statistics Canada, almost one-quarter (23.1%) of Canadian adults 
were classified as obese and 36.1 percent or 8.6 million people were overweight in 2004 
(Statistics Canada, 2005).  In 2006, the Canadian Restaurant and Foodservices 
Association (CRFA) in association with Health Canada created a Trans Fat Task Force to 
determine methods to decrease the trans fats in the nation’s diet.  Although trans fats 
occur naturally in some animal based foods, they are also formed during the process to 
manufacture semi-solid fats such as shortening and hard margarines.  There is scientific 
evidence that a diet high in saturated and trans fats can increase the risk of developing 
heart disease (Health Canada, 2009).  On June 20, 2007, the Minister of Health 
announced that Health Canada will monitor the progress of the Canadian food industry to 
meet the Task Force recommendations: 
1) Limit the trans fat content to two percent of the total fat content for 
vegetable oil and margarines. 
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 2) Limit the trans fat content to five percent of the total fat content for all 
other foods.  This includes any food and ingredients sold to restaurants. 
(Health Canada, 2009) 
 Food manufacturers are also encouraged to use fewer saturated fats and trans fats 
and replacing them with healthier fat alternatives such as monounsaturated and poly 
unsaturated fats.  While currently there are no regulations that require the Canadian food 
industry to follow these recommendations however, the Minister is on track to develop 
laws to ensure the trans fat limits will be met (Health Canada, 2009).  Major franchise 
chain restaurants have felt the pressure and are following the trend to reduce trans fats, 
for example KFC has switched from hydrogenated cooking oil for canola in order to 
eliminate trans fat from their oil (Euromonitor International, 2008).  On January 1, 2008, 
the Calgary Health Region passed regulation to limit trans fat to two percent.  However, a 
massive overhaul within Alberta’s health system from the new Alberta Health Services 
Board has dissolved this rule.  Unfortunately, Calgary health inspectors can no longer 
inspect and enforce that restaurants abide by the trans fat rules because there is no 
province wide standardization for trans fat policies (CBC.ca, 2009).   
1.1.4 Canadian Dining Trends 
Despite of the growing trend for healthier foods, consumer demand for indulgent 
foods is also increasing.  Consumers are well informed and aware that certain foods are 
not as healthy yet they still indulge in foods such as pizzas, iced frappes and bacon 
cheeseburgers (Euromonitor, 2009).  A survey conducted by the National Restaurant 
Association found that on average men and women eat 4.6 and 3.8 commercially 
prepared meals per week respectively (Binkley, 2006).   
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 Figure 1:3 below charts the results of a Statistics Canada survey on eating habits 
of Canadians in 2004.   The survey revealed that in general one-quarter of Canadians eat 
from fast food outlets.  Of that, one-third of adolescents (fourteen to eighteen year olds) 
eat food prepared from a fast food restaurant.  The demographic that has the highest 
prevalence to eat fast food regularly at thirty-nine percent are men aged nineteen to thirty 
years. (Statistics Canada, 2006).  The survey further reported that of the Canadians that 
frequent fast food establishments, forty percent chose to eat a hamburger, pizza, hot dog 
or a sandwich.  Also twenty-five percent chose to drink regular soft drinks rather than 
diet pop (Statistics Canada, 2006).   
Figure 1:3 Percentage consuming food prepared in fast food outlets3 
Percentage consuming food prepared in fast food outlets, by age and 
sex, Canada 2004 - excluding territories
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3 Statistics Canada. (2004). 2004 Canadian Community Health Survey: Nutrition. Retrieved June 13, 2009 
from http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/82-620-m/2006002/c-g/4144195-eng.htm 
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 Canadian consumer trends for restaurant spending and traffic is displayed in 
Figure 1:4.  The study by NPD reveals that the quick service restaurant segment accounts 
for 60.1 percent of consumer’s spending in the total foodservice market.  The casual 
dining sector is the next largest segment with 14.1 percent of the foodservice market 
spending and fine dining only accounts for a small portion, 0.9 percent of what is spent in 
the total dining industry. (CRFA, 2009).   
Despite the current economic downturn, Canadians continue to dine out.  This is 
demonstrated by the moderate growth in spending at quick service restaurants.  NPD 
Group a market research firm conducted a survey of households in 2009 which indicated 
that an allocation of consumer’s disposable income to the total foodservice market rose 
five percent when comparing the periods between the twelve months ending February of 
2008 and the twelve months ending February 2009, please refer to Figure 1:4 below  
(CRFA, 2009).  Fine dining showed a dramatic drop of nine percent in spending due to 
fewer patrons and smaller average checks per person.  Fine dining is a luxury good and 
service therefore during hard economic times consumer spending is reduced for that 
product and substituted for a lower cost item.  Quick service restaurants showed a five 
percent year-over-year increase for patronage spending where traffic remained the same 
but the average check price rose by 3.7 percent due to both price increases and greater 
consumption (CRFA, 2009).   Dining out is an integral part of the Canadian lifestyle and 
seemingly the facts suggest that the convenience and quick service offered by fast food 
restaurants is something consumers are not willing to sacrifice.     
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 Figure 1:4 Canadian Restaurant Trends4 
Canadian Restaurant Trends, % Change 
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1.1.5 Hamburger Market Share Trends 
In 2007, fast food sales in Canada exceeded $19 billion, which grew at rate of 
four percent despite the increasing awareness of the unhealthy stigma associated with fast 
food as stated in section 1.1.3 Health Trends (Euromonitor, 2008).  Burgers are the 
consumer’s premier choice when dining out at a quick service restaurant.  According to a 
2006 study by NPD Group, the hamburger category accounts for twenty-eight percent of 
all quick service visits in Canada and the U.S (Glazer, 2007).  Below, Figure 1:5 shows 
the breakdown of consumer’s choices for the major food categories.  
 
                                                     
4 CRFA (2009). Eating Out Quarterly: Results for Q1 2009: Restaurant Trends. Retrieved June 23, 2009 
from http://www.crfa.ca/research/statistics/eatingoutquarterly.asp#2 
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 Figure 1:5  Quick Service Restaurant Segments5 
 
 
Many fast food chains have been able to produce higher quality burgers to meet 
consumer demands for better value for their money.  From 2006 to 2007, NPD Group 
monitored the incremental traffic change of the top ten restaurant categories.  The 
hamburger category showed the largest trend increase of 304 million more visits in 2007 
than in 2006 (Glazer, June 2007).  In a five-year period from 2002 to 2007, hamburgers 
supplanted the ‘other sandwich’ category that includes chains such as Subway and 
Arby’s, as shown in Figure 1:6 and Figure 1:7 below.  
                                                     
5 Glazer, Fern, (2007). NPD: QSR chains expanding globally must also act locally. Retrieved June 14, 2009 
from http://www.nrn.com/article.aspx?keyword=quick-service&menu_id=1418&id=346804 
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 Figure 1:6 Top Ten Foodservice Segments, 2003 vs. 20026 
2003 vs. 2002 Top Ten Foodservice Segments
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Figure 1:7  Top Ten Foodservice Segments, 2007 vs. 20067 
2007 vs. 2006 Top Ten Foodservice Segments
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6 Glazer, Fern, (2007). NPD: Gourmet coffee and tea, burgers top growth segments. Retrieved May 22, 
2009 from http://www.cafemakers.com/news/segment-trends.pdf 
7 Glazer, Fern, (2007). NPD: Gourmet coffee and tea, burgers top growth segments. Retrieved May 22, 
2009 from http://www.cafemakers.com/news/segment-trends.pdf 
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 1.1.6 Fast Food Breakfast Trends 
According to MacLean’s Magazine breakfast accounts for an estimated US$40 
billion annually in food sales in the U.S. alone.   Fast food companies capture about sixty 
percent of the breakfast market and are predicted to have up to eight percent annual 
growth, or $3 billion a year (Gulli, 2007).  Industry wide, breakfast sales account for 
eleven percent of revenue, and for McDonald’s more than twenty-five percent of their 
sales are from breakfast (Horovitz, 2007).  Starbuck’s upscale breakfast sandwiches are 
estimated to bring an additional US$35,000 in revenue per store.  McDonald’s has 
counteracted with a strategy offering McGriddles® and premium coffee which has 
proven to be successful since it has driven a growth of thirty-three percent to US$20 
billion since 2002 (Gulli, 2007).  In Canada, according to the Canadian Restaurant and 
Food Association (CRFA), morning breakfast snacks account for over thirty-two percent 
of sales of fast food outlets, with Tim Horton’s capturing a large proportion of the market 
(Euromonitor, 2008).   
Historically the majority of fast food chains have focussed on lunch and dinner as 
the mainstay of their sales.  Alternatively, coffee shops served doughnuts and muffins.  
Now however, these coffee shop franchises are boosting their revenues with breakfast 
sales.  An NPD study showed that the trend of people eating breakfast at home is 
declining.  This can be demonstrated in that toast consumption has declined from twenty-
six percent to thirteen percent over the last couple of decades (Gulli, 2007).  Recently, 
drive-through convenience, coffee and breakfast sandwiches have flourished; and 
although McDonald’s has dominated the breakfast market for decades, competitor chains 
have been aggressively marketing their breakfast menus to garner a share of the market.  
 12
 Convenience, time and value are important drivers for the breakfast market however one 
determining factor that establishes sales is that people are ritualistic and habitual: forty-
eight percent of people polled indicate their breakfast choices are driven by routine 
(MacLean’s, 2007).  Therefore, chains must compete heavily to obtain and maintain 
regular breakfast customers.  According to CRFA and Statistics Canada the most popular 
food ordered at Canadian restaurants are French fries and the most popular beverage is 
coffee (CRFA, 2009). 
1.2 Company Overview 
In 1980, the Smith family purchased a small Dairy Queen Brazier store in a 
remote town in Northern Canada for $600,000.  The store was very small staffing fewer 
than ten people, and yielding moderate revenues.  In 1989, the owners purchased the 
adjacent five lots and built a larger DQ Brazier store.  The old DQ was demolished 
turning the older property into a parking lot for the new store.  The new store was an 
instant success and revenues doubled.  In 1998, further renovations occurred and a drive-
thru window was added.  The drive-thru window was a very successful addition as 
revenues increased another forty percent.  Starting in the late 1990s, the city experienced 
a large growth in population and the Smith family took advantage of this demographic 
and economic ‘boom’ by building another DQ.  As with most businesses in the province, 
economic growth was driven by wealth from natural resources.  To this date, both stores 
have prospered and have consistently placed in the top ten grossing DQ stores in Western 
Canada.  In spite of both stores having approximately double total sales revenues 
comparative to the national average for Canadian DQs; the economic downturn has 
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 slowed growth dramatically to almost zero percent for the first quarter sales of 2008 and 
2009 (AM. D.Q. Corp., 2009).     
1.3 International Dairy Queen (IDQ) Overview  
1.3.1 IDQ History 
Sherb Noble opened the very first Dairy Queen store in 1940 in Joliet, Illinois.  
The founders of Dairy Queen built their store around the concept of a soft serve ice cream 
dessert product.  A common misconception people have is they believe DQ’s soft serve is 
made from cream; however, it is made from milk and therefore renders a reduced fat ice 
cream.  Dairy Queen was one of the first companies to begin expanding its operations 
through the franchise system.  DQ’s signature soft serve ice cream with its patented 
trademark ‘curl’ grew to become a popular American brand.  As of June 2009, there are 
5,862 DQs operating in the United States, Canada and nineteen other countries globally.  
The first DQ opened in Canada in 1953 in Estevan, Saskatchewan (AM. D.Q. Corp., 
2007).  The majority of DQ restaurants are individually owned and operated franchises 
with independent business owners.  In January 1998, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. purchased 
International Dairy Queen (IDQ) along with its subsidiary companies, Orange Julius and 
Karmelkorn Shoppes.   
1.3.2 IDQ Growth 
In 2007, the IDQ generated almost $3.0 billion in global sales, a 4.8 percent 
growth increase of sales in 2006.  A breakdown of system sales reveals that thirty-six 
percent was generated through food, four percent from beverages and sixty percent from 
treat item sales.  As seen in Figure 1:8 below, U.S. same store-sales, or sales of stores 
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 open more than one year, increased 3.9 percent while Canadian same-store sales 
increased 5.5 percent from 2006 to 2007 (AM. D.Q. Corp., 2008).  
Figure 1:8 Same-to-Same Sales8 
 
Figure 1:9 below shows that approximately four-fifths of the system sales 
occurred in food-centric based DQ concept restaurants, whereas one-fifth of the sales are 
from treat-centric DQ stores (AM. D.Q. Corp., 2008).  Treat-centric DQ stores are the 
DQ/Limited Brazier and the DQ/Orange Julius Treat Center franchises that have the full 
line of DQ treat products with a very limited food menu that usually entails only hot dog 
products.  Food-centric DQ stores are the DQ Brazier and the DQ Grill & Chill franchises 
that carry the full menu product line for both DQ treats and food.  The strengths of sales 
from the food-centric concepts are one contributing factor for IDQ to encourage their 
franchisees to remodel to the DQ Grill & Chill concept.  A reason why food-centric 
concepts generate most of the sales is that there are many more food-centric stores than 
                                                     
8 AM. D.Q. Corp. (2008). DQ 2008 Pride and Unity Report. International Dairy Queen, Inc. 
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 treat-centric ones.  In Section 1.3.4 IDQ Size, Table 1-1 shows there are only 765 treat-
centric stores out of 5862 internationally in 2009, therefore the sales generated is 
proportionately smaller.   
Figure 1:9  International DQ 2007 Performance9 
 
1.3.3 IDQ Strategy 
1.3.3.1 IDQ Differentiation Strategy 
The Dairy Queen franchise began in the 1940s and has a well branded family 
atmosphere with identifiable quality ice cream and fast food products.  DQs are well 
known for their Blizzards and patented ‘curl’ on the top of their DQ treats.  Firms in a 
monopolistic competitive market must differentiate their product in order to create a 
competitive advantage and establish consumer loyalty.  An industry has a monopolistic 
competitive market when it is characterized by several factors: 1) There are many buyers 
and sellers, 2) Each firm produces a differentiated product, and 3) there is free entry into 
and exit from the industry (Baye, 2006).   The fast food industry has many features of a 
monopolistic competitive market and firms typically expend many resources to market 
                                                     
9 AM. D.Q. Corp. (2008). DQ 2008 Pride and Unity Report. International Dairy Queen, Inc. 
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 and differentiate their products.   For instance, a burger from one chain like McDonald’s 
is not a perfect substitute for one from DQ, the burger price and quality differs enough  
allowing each firm to have some market power within their differentiation.  The DQ 
brand is a well known, however overall the franchise has been suffering.  The last 
successful product IDQ has introduced was the Blizzard® in 1985.  IDQ has launched 
several different products in past years but none have experienced the success and the 
identifying name brand appeal as the Blizzard®.  IDQ’s decision to try to redefine the 
brand image and focus away from delicious ice cream treats to a more food orientated 
design will hopefully revitalize the franchise.   
DQ’s products can be classified as both impulse products and as a specialty 
product.  An impulse product is one that is bought spontaneously, dependant on the 
consumer and the situation.  Consumers will have ‘cravings’ and impulsively buy their 
desired burger or ice cream treat.  As a specialty product, the consumer will only 
specifically purchase a certain brand or product.  In a different situation the same 
consumer may plan ahead to have lunch or dinner or meet up with friends at the DQ, in 
other words they are willing to spend the extra time and effort to obtain a specific DQ ice 
cream treat or burger.   
The fast food industry is largely in the mature market stage of the typical product 
life cycle, with each restaurant chain or individual restaurant advertises and markets 
heavily in order to create a niche in the industry.  In order to retain customers and 
increase consumer loyalty, the restaurant chains are continually improving old products 
or introducing new ones.  One of IDQ’s strengths is the broad product portfolio the 
restaurants offer as a quick service franchise.  It is critical that all fast food restaurants to 
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 operate on a cost-based strategy through their supply chain and shared marketing and 
operational resources.  IDQ relies on a more differentiated strategy since no other fast 
food restaurant offers the wide range of soft serve ice cream treats along side food 
products such as burgers, hot dogs, chicken, salads, wraps and iron grilled sandwiches.  
Over the years, DQ has been losing market share to competitors like McDonald’s who 
efficiently operate with a low-cost strategy and to the largest growing quick service 
franchisor, Tim Hortons who has become Canada’s largest foodservice company with 
twenty-two percent of fast food sales (Euromonitor, 2008).      
IDQ’s strategy since the inception of the DQ Grill & Chill design in 2001 was to 
re-brand the DQ image in order to be more competitive.  DQ has a strong iconic image 
with its ice cream treats however to re-vitalize its old image, a more food-centric concept 
is combined with a more inviting casual dining atmosphere and healthier meal options.   
To revitalize the stagnant brand image of Dairy Queen, IDQ is marketing the Grill & 
Chill as a fast, yet casual dining restaurant.  The concept was designed to create a new 
niche in the saturated fast food industry where franchises have the need to constantly 
differentiate their products in order to be economically profitable.  The Grill & Chill is a 
hybrid concept between the fast food genre and a casual sit-down restaurant (Wolkowitz, 
2005).   According to Mike Keller, chief brand officer of US IDQ headquarters, "our 
efforts were about modernizing an American icon that had grown tired over more than six 
decades," he continues. "Unit growth had stagnated. To build bigger restaurants and put 
them in better real estate, we needed to change the brand.  For several years we were 
losing more stores than opening new ones." (Wolkowitz, 2005).  Customers are greeted 
to a more upscale style DQ where they order their food or treats at the counter then are 
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 brought their baskets of food by the employees.  The Grill & Chill offers a larger food 
menu while the ice milk treats are identical to the original DQ (Wolkowitz, 2005).   
As a fast food establishment, DQ service would be considered a ‘homogeneous’ 
service or one that is typical of every other fast food franchise.  Customers would enter 
the establishment, order their food at the counter, wait a few minutes for their order to be 
prepared then proceed to sit down to eat their meal.  The DQ Grill & Chill concept 
differentiates the service.  Instead of having the customer wait at the counter for their 
food, they are given a number placard, an empty cup for their pop so they can fill their 
own drinks then can proceed to sit down at a table.  An employee will then expedite or 
bring their food to the customer.   
The positioning strategy is two-fold. First, it helps re-brand the overall image of 
the DQ by becoming more food centric but still maintaining its strong dessert/ice cream 
consumer base, this is done by the improved ‘service’ style.  Second is the expansion of 
the food menu to cater towards more ‘meal-like’ lunches and dinners.  The purpose of the 
strategy is catered to enhance the customer’s perception of value with DQ’s food and 
service.  According to Dave Acton, Area Vice President of Dairy Queen Canada, DQ’s 
rebranding is to create a more upscale fast food restaurant, which provides high quality 
table service that reduces the customer’s perceived wait time.   By the time customers 
fills their pop and seats themselves; their food order is usually served within three 
minutes.  The change of service style will hopefully place DQ Grill and Chills as a new 
hybrid between a full service restaurant and a fast food restaurant and create a positive 
atmosphere of enhanced value for the consumer.  IDQ hopes that these changes will 
attract and retain a larger portion of the industry’s market persuading consumers that DQ 
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 is a great place to not only get their ice cream treats but is a restaurant alternative for hot 
meals.   
1.3.3.2 IDQ Cost Strategy 
The differentiated strategy may not have been as successful as IDQ hoped for; 
therefore, they have pulled back slightly and focussed more on a cost strategy.  In 2004, 
the Unified Purchasing Alliance (UPA) was formed to help lower food costs to Canadian 
franchisees.  The UPA’s efforts to minimize the  increasing costs was demonstrated by 
utilizing RFPs (Requests for Proposals) for major protein items, transportation costs and 
equipment costs; as such, in 2007, more than $500,000 in freight costs were saved using 
this new system (AM. D.Q. Corp., 2008).  Figure 1:10 below depicts IDQ’s quarterly 
spending plotted against the weighted index of market prices of comparable products.  
The UPA was successful and brought a twenty-three percent cost savings to franchisees 
related to the protein and bread for the Iron Grilled Sandwiches; resultantly, DQ has 
plans to continue monitoring distribution margins (AM. D.Q. Corp., 2008).   
IDQ realized they were losing market share because a value offering was lacking 
on the menu.  A more permanent value menu was needed in several provinces because 
DQ had the highest prices as a quick service restaurant in comparison to its competitors.  
In July 2008, Dairy Queen Canada proceeded with the Sweet Deals value menu that 
allows customers to tailor up to 20,450 different combinations with a tiered pricing 
structure, see Figure 1:11 below for a sample Sweet Deals menu.  Cheeseburgers make 
up the majority of the Sweet Deals with chicken wraps as the runner-up.  Stores in the 
United States and Canada have reported that Sweet Deals make up from six to twenty 
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 percent of total sales, with one store reporting his customer count per day increased by 
forty-six percent (World of DQ, 2009).   
Figure 1:10  IDQ Actual Cost Spending vs. Related Market Prices10 
 
DQ’s marketing team has already begun multiple public relations and marketing 
efforts to drive traffic and sales, generate press coverage, via national print and TV 
advertising as well as Web 2.0 marketing including blogs and social media sites to 
reinforce DQ’s brand image.  The Sweet Deals menu is critical for IDQ’s success during 
uncertain economic times and has provided what consumers want is more value of 
quality food for less money.  The Sweet Deals menu has been thoroughly tested and 
franchisees are obtaining increased number of transactions, higher average check prices 
along with lower costs of goods sold (COGS) which is adding value to both consumers 
and operators (World of DQ, 2009).   
                                                     
10 AM. D.Q. Corp. (2008). DQ 2008 Pride and Unity Report. International Dairy Queen, Inc. Actual values 
removed for confidentiality. 
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 Figure 1:11 DQ Sweet Deals Menu11 
 
1.3.3.3 Strategic Fit Grid 
The fast food industry as a whole is inclined towards a more cost-based strategy; 
however, IDQ’s strategic fit adapted from Ed Bukszar (2009), is summarized in Table 1:1 
below.  IDQ has a few differentiated dimensions that make it difficult to compete 
effectively.  The IDQ’s headquarters is based in Minneapolis, Minnesota and essentially 
all research and development, and decision making for the entire franchise is determined 
by the head office.  Dairy Queen Canada is based in Ontario and monitors the nation’s 
restaurants through regional consultants.  Decision-making is less autonomous and the 
structure is centralized for any high-level governing aspects of the franchise.  Franchisees 
                                                     
11 World of DQ. (April 2009). What’s Your Deal? World of DQ, April 2009, pp. 14-16. 
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 have some autonomy for the daily operations of their stores however, they have to adhere 
to all products and guidelines set out by the head office.   
Table 1:1  IDQ's Strategic Fit Grid 
 Cost Based     Differentiation
 Low Cost, Adequate 
Quality 
    High Quality, Adequate Cost
 Source 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Product 
Strategy 
Rapid 
Follower 
      X  
 
  Innovative 
R&D 
Expenses 
Low     X   
 
   High 
Structure Centralized 
 
 X         Decentralized 
Decision 
Making 
Less 
Autonomy 
X          Autonomy 
Production, 
Service 
Economies of 
Scale 
     X   
 
  Economies of 
Scope,Flexible 
Labour Mass 
Production 
   X      
 
 Highly Skilled, 
Flexible 
Marketing Comparative, 
Push 
     X     Pioneering, 
Pull 
Risk Profile Low Risk 
 
   X       High Risk 
Capital 
Structure 
Leveraged 
(Debt) 
X          Conservative 
(Equity) 
 
Since DQ has quite a broad product offering with its treats and food, many of 
their products utilize the same ingredients and materials.  Economies of scope, are 
achieved since many products are produced from the same base materials as a result it 
lowers costs since they are spread out over many products.  For instance, Orange Julius 
drinks use the exact same strawberries that are used for DQ sundaes, Blizzards®, and 
shakes.  Cone coating used to make dipped cones is used for DQ ice cream cakes and 
Blizzards®.  Economies of scale are not readily achieved for IDQ because many of the 
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 suppliers are regional or subject to commodity prices.  The fragmented supply chain 
results in higher costs since DQ’s buyer power is reduced.   
IDQ historically maintained a differentiation strategy but they have not been very 
successful because of loss of market share due to their higher product costs.  They are 
slowly shifting their focus towards a cost strategy but drastic restructuring changes are 
needed to take advantage of economies of scale and other cost-based functions to be 
competitive.  The current mixed strategy is problematic for IDQ since they are unable to 
outcompete rivals due to their high fixed costs. 
1.3.4 IDQ Size 
A phone interview on June 18, 2009 with Dave Acton, Area Vice President of 
Dairy Queen Canada indicated the most recent data for the number of DQ stores globally 
summarized in Table 1:2 below.  The number of DQ stores has grown to 5,862 units 
worldwide, of which, 624 are in Canada.   
Table 1:2 June 18, 2009 Breakdown of DQ Stores Globally 
 DQ Brazier Grill & Chill Treat Centers Subtotal 
Canada 434 70 120 624 
U.S. 3773 433 425 4631 
International 367 20 220 607 
Subtotal 4574 523 765 5862 
 
According to Euromonitor International, DQ’s 2008 brand share, or the amount of 
dollars a consumer spends on a particular brand in comparison to its competitors, was 0.7 
percent for consumer foodservice value in Canada.  As Table 1:3 shows below, DQ’s 
market share is small in comparison to its largest competitors and substitutes.  Tim 
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 Hortons has the largest market share at 9.3 percent and McDonald’s holds a 6.1 percent 
share (Euromonitor International, 2009).  A more detailed analysis of DQ’s competitors 
will be conducted in Section 2.1.5 of Porter’s Five Force analysis of competitors and 
substitutes.   
Table 1:3  Brand Shares - Foodservice Value RSP % Breakdown12 
Company Brand 2006 2007 2008 
Tim Hortons 8.5 9 9.3 
McDonald’s 5.8 5.9 6.1 
A&W 1.3 1.4 1.5 
Wendy’s 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Dairy Queen 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Burger King 0.7 0.7 0.6 
 
1.4 Problems Facing ABC Holdings 
A strategic plan is needed for the owners of ABC Holdings, Jay is past the age of 
retirement.  The corporation is a parent company to two Dairy Queens (DQ) located in a 
small city in Northern Canada.  Although the restaurants are very successful, many 
problems hinder a smooth transition either to sell the restaurants to an independent buyer 
or to transfer each location to his children.  Jay has been resisting any changes with the 
restaurants for many years and has troubles releasing some of his personal control of the 
business.   
There is no clear focus on the future of the organization since Jay has been 
satisfied to keep things as they are, without making any major changes to the stores.  
Neither store has any debt on either the land nor building therefore business has remained 
                                                     
12 Euromonitor International (2009). Consumer Foodservice: Euromonitor from trade sources/national 
statistics. Retrieved June 12, 2009 from http://www.euromonitor.com 
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 very profitable.  International Dairy Queen (IDQ) has been pressuring Jay to either 
modernize, that is, give the stores a ‘facelift’ or completely upgrade the DQs to a Grill & 
Chill concept in order to align his stores with IDQ’s changing strategy of value-added 
service.  However, he has been able to stall IDQ’s suggestions as he has been a strong 
franchisee with exclusive rights to the city.  If Jay were to transfer the stores to his adult 
children, IDQ would most likely require upgrades to the stores before new franchise 
agreements could be signed.  In addition, not one of Jay’s children would have enough 
capital to purchase either of the stores without a leveraged buy-out and Jay co-signing the 
loan.   
Another ongoing problem has been the lack of trust and infighting within the 
family.  A common problem indicative of family-owned companies is the lack of a clear 
direction and purpose for the business.  Although two of his kids have been managing 
each store for many years, Jay has not allowed them access to the financial performance 
of the company, thus it has hindered their ability to manage effectively.  Disagreements 
arise as to how the stores should be managed, although Jay no longer directly operates the 
stores on a daily basis, he countermands any decisions to change how the stores are 
operated.  The organization overall is one of complacency where the employees and 
management are happy to maintain the status quo and perform the daily routine without 
any regard to improve operating performance. 
1.4.1 Decision Criteria 
Management preferences have a very strong influence over any decisions made 
for business.  Ultimately, nothing will happen unless Jay decides it is time to retire and 
sell the business either to his children or to a third party.  Another factor to the decision 
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 making process is whether the children would want to take over the restaurants.  The 
expense for the children to buy the restaurants, in addition to the cost of renovation may 
not make it worthwhile when compared to the option of selling the stores outright to a 
third party.  An additional factor that may influence Jay’s reluctance to make any changes 
is the depressed economy; it is not a seller’s market in this current economic recession 
and may be better to wait until the value of his restaurant and land rises. 
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 2: External Analysis of the Canadian Fast Food Industry 
The Canadian fast food industry had over $19 billion in sales in 2007, which was 
a four percent growth from the previous year.  In 2007, there were a total number of 
33,727 fast food outlets in Canada, a one percent increase from 2006 (Euromonitor, 
2008).  According to the CRFA, limited service restaurants account for thirty-two percent 
of the Canadian foodservice industry’s market share, these include quick service 
restaurants, cafeterias, food courts and take-out delivery stores (CRFA, 2009).  The fast 
food industry is not as affected by tourism trends and is more reliant upon the general 
population for its largest consumer group.  One of the major drivers for growth for this 
industry is due to Tim Horton’s as Canada’s largest fast food outlet (Euromonitor, 2008). 
2.1 Industry Analysis – Porter’s Five Forces on the Northern 
Canadian Hamburger Fast Food Industry 
In 1979, Michael Porter a Harvard Business School professor wrote a famous 
article that outlines a framework for industry analysis to help determine an industry’s 
attractiveness.  A competitive strategy can then be developed after examination of five 
forces that influence the structure and profitability of an industry.  Porter’s Five Forces 
model entails the identification and understanding of the structural characteristics of 
industries and the forces that influence the behaviour of the firms (Bourgeois et al, 1999).   
The Five Forces are: 
1) The Threat of New Entry 
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 2) The Power of Suppliers 
3) The Power of Buyers  
4) The Threat of Substitute Products 
5) Rivalry 
2.1.1 The Threat of New Entry – High Threat of Entry 
According to Porter, if rivals can enter an industry easily, then it would increase 
competition and reduce profitability.  A few of the major barriers to entry are capital 
requirements, brand identity or product differentiation, economies of scale, switching costs, and 
access to distribution channels.   
2.1.1.1 Capital Requirements – Low entry & exit costs 
The fast food industry is dominated by large franchises that have procedures and 
financial requirements in place for franchisees to easily enter new markets.  The capital 
requirements can be as little as $200,000 for a mall location, to $750,000 for a stand-
alone restaurant.   Capital requirement costs can be even lower if the franchisee leases the 
land rather than purchases the land for the store.  The support network provided by chain 
headquarters is quite extensive, reducing the start-up costs for their franchisees.  
Franchise headquarters have the resources to conduct market research to determine prime 
locations for entry.  Franchisors also have pre-planned architectural plans and interior 
design plans in place therefore there is little to no such cost for a franchisee to set up a 
restaurant.  Distribution channels and supply chains are established throughout the nation 
and it would be relatively easy to enter a new area.  Legal fees and contracts are prepared 
and maintained by franchise operations teams therefore franchisees do not have to 
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 contend with high legal fees.  Project co-ordination and a time-line is pre-planned for 
construction, equipment installation, training, and marketing are all support services the 
franchise has in place which in turn reduces entry costs.  New franchisees also have the 
tendency to be the primary operator/manager for their stores; therefore they will have 
lower labour costs at the outset. 
Exit costs are also low since it is easy for a franchisee to sell their restaurant or in 
some cases, the franchisor has a recruiting program for applicants who wish to take over 
a restaurant.  Some franchises, like McDonald’s prefer to own the building and do not 
allow franchisees the option to own the building, therefore entry and exit costs are further 
reduced.  The low costs of entry and exit along with the ease of entry from franchise 
support make the industry attractive for new entrants especially in a market with good 
opportunities and room for more competitors.  
Fast food restaurants not associated with any franchise conglomerate may have 
higher entry costs since they will not have the advantage of access to the resources 
provided by franchisors.  They will also not have access to larger economies of scale of 
the distribution networks and the brand reputation of the large chains.  However, 
independent restaurants have the flexibility and freedom to choose their capital assets 
such as the building and equipment.  It is still relatively easy for an independent 
restaurant to enter a new market since the scale of their operation can be small and costs 
are minimized.  For example, a small restaurant that leases its building has relatively 
small capital requirements in comparison to a franchisee who wishes to own the land and 
building.   
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 2.1.1.2 Brand Identity or Product Differentiation – Moderate Barrier to Entry 
Brand identity is very important in the fast food industry in order to create product 
differentiation to allow slight price differences among the chains.  Reputational capital is 
a key factor for a chained restaurant to enhance consumer perceived value since it aids 
the success of a store if consumers in the market are already familiar with the brand.  The 
expectation of product quality, consistency and service is important for first impressions 
to reinforce the acceptance of a new entrant from a consumer’s standpoint.  All major 
chained stores are familiar with competing in the heavily saturated foodservice market; 
therefore they require aggressive marketing strategies.  Most franchises charge a 
franchise fee that can range from four percent to 12.5 percent of gross sales, which is the 
payoff for a franchisee to capitalize upon the reputational capital fast food corporations 
create.  In addition to franchise fees, many chain restaurants charge marketing fees to 
maintain regional, national and global advertising campaigns.   
One disadvantage an independent restaurant suffers from is the lack of brand 
awareness and reputational capital to utilize.  The marketing budget will be very small in 
comparison to the franchises therefore awareness of the new entrant will be somewhat 
limited.  Also, many consumers who are not familiar with an unbranded foodservice 
establishment may be apprehensive for trying a new restaurant.   
A key success factor for fast food restaurants is the ability to satisfy customers by 
providing a menu that is attractive and satisfies their needs and cravings.  By offering a 
wide variety of items on the menu including healthy, fresh food, restaurants appeals to 
more customers.  Restaurants need to be flexible and adaptable to market trends.  The 
ability to market food products and create brand loyalty is key because products like 
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 burgers are homogeneous or similar in nature therefore fast food restaurants spend a lot 
of effort and resources to differentiate their products.  It is also key for customers to 
perceive they are getting added value and quality with their food which further enhances 
customer satisfaction and retention.  One thing that every franchise emphasizes with their 
training and product preparation and specifications is to ensure food consistency across 
all their chains, therefore customer expectations can be satisfied no matter where they 
visit one of their franchises.   
2.1.1.3 Economies of Scale – Moderate Barrier to Entry 
Chained restaurants benefit from economies of scale concerning their supply, 
distribution, marketing as well as learning economies that independent restaurants do not 
have access to at lower costs.  Economies of scale are reduced costs per unit because 
production is large enough to spread costs over a larger scale.  Chained restaurants are 
able to consolidate their supply and distribution network over large regions so they are 
able to benefit from lower costs and increased operational efficiencies.  They are better 
able to reach a minimum efficient scale (MES) in order to produce at a low average unit 
cost, which in turn lowers the long-run average costs of the organization.    
A key success factor for fast food restaurants is to operate with low costs because 
their products are homogeneous and consumers are price sensitive.  Although franchises 
place a lot of effort to differentiate their brands, fast food customer’s demand for their 
products will vary according their price.  Therefore, if a restaurant consistently has higher 
prices for a hamburger, then a customer will prefer to buy that hamburger at a different 
store at a lower price if they perceive their quality is similar.  
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 2.1.1.4 Switching Costs – Low Barrier to Entry 
Consumers have no switching costs for eating at different fast food restaurants.  If 
a new incumbent enters the market, customers can easily dine at the new restaurant.  
Convenience is a large factor that determines where a person will eat, therefore location, 
convenience, fast service, consistent food quality are all assets that will attract both 
regular and impulse customers.  A drive-thru in a convenient high traffic location is an 
asset that would be beneficial for a new entrant to have in order to encourage consumers 
to buy their food.  If a new entrant is able to locate in an ideal location, there is a good 
opportunity for them to enter the market.  
2.1.1.5 Access to Distribution Channels – Low Barrier to Entry 
Every major restaurant chain has their own distribution network or contracts with 
major distribution suppliers.  The ability to purchase in large quantities is an asset to 
reduce costs because it enables resources to be purchased at lower prices.  These include 
food products such as meat, produce, and dairy as well as paper products for wrappings 
purchased through established distribution networks.  It is also easy for individual 
restaurants not affiliated with an established chain to access goods from already 
established distribution networks.  Companies such as Sysco, Sunspun, Bridge Brand and 
Loblaws are large food distributors already supply many large and small restaurants in 
Northern Canada.  The fast food industry is a cost sensitive industry, therefore in the long 
run, it is advantageous to have access to a reliable, consistent supply that is cost effective.  
Smaller restaurants do not have significant buyer power in comparison to the larger 
chains, therefore they will tend to have higher food costs. 
 33
 2.1.1.6 The Threat of Entry - Conclusion 
Overall, the barrier to entry is not very significant to prevent larger chained 
restaurants because they have larger brand awareness and marketing budgets as well as 
access to larger distribution networks with lower costs.  Smaller restaurants are able to 
enter the quick service sector relatively easy as well, however they may have a cost 
disadvantage with regards to supply costs.  On the other hand, some of their operating 
costs will be lower in comparison to franchises since they do not have to pay monthly 
franchise and marketing fees.  They are also not required to adhere to corporation 
standards and procedures for production and promotions.  If the foodservice industry in 
the Northern Canadian city appears profitable, then it would be relatively easy for 
entrants to establish a restaurant in the market.  There are no significant barriers to entry 
that would prevent entry however, a key success factor would be to secure a site that 
would be located in an area with optimal traffic.  Firms with additional financial capital 
would be better able to afford prime real estate locations that have a higher chance of 
success. 
2.1.2 The Power of Suppliers – Moderate to High Power 
According to Porter, if suppliers in a particular industry have significant power, 
then they will be able to extract higher prices for critical components, which reduce the 
industry’s average profitability.  In general, two factors determine the strength of supplier 
power.  The first is if there are only a few suppliers for a particular product relative to a 
large number of buyers.  Therefore, demand for the product is higher than the supply, 
which results in the ability for suppliers to charge premium prices for their crucial good.  
The second is if the supplier has control over an important product, then they will have 
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 greater power in general (Bourgeois et al, 1999).   The main inputs for a fast food 
restaurant are labour, food supplies, beverage supplies, and equipment.  Many of the 
larger chains have reduced the hold their suppliers have by vertically integrating and 
distribute their own proprietary supplies to their franchisees. 
2.1.2.1 Labour – Moderate-low Power 
In 2006, the province was in the middle of a severe labour shortage, and analysts 
estimated there was a shortage of 100,000 workers over the next ten years (McGinnis, 
2006).  It was a very difficult period for many years for small businesses including 
restaurants.  The shortage was more prevalent in the more remote rural areas of the 
province because firms not only had the difficulty of finding employees, but they had to 
pay a relatively higher wage to people occupying low skilled positions (The Daily, 2006).   
The situation changed dramatically since the recession.  The unemployment rate 
in the United States reached a twenty-five year high of 9.4 percent with a loss of over 6.0 
million jobs while the Canadian unemployment rate rose to 8.4 percent in May 2008 
(Canada’s Economic Action Plan, 2009).  In contrast, the unemployment rate in the 
province was 6.6 percent; therefore, the supply of labour in the province was not as 
readily available as the rest of the country.  The government hopes that its policies and 
action plan will stabilize and slowly recover the Canadian economy for the second half of 
2009.  One of the Action Plan’s aims is to create or preserve 190,000 jobs through 
innovations with the Employment Insurance (EI) system, a Home Renovation Tax Credit 
and many federal infrastructure projects to upgrade bridges, roads and buildings.  As seen 
from Figure 2:1 below, the majority of jobs, sixty percent, where created in the 
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 construction sector and the remaining jobs were in industries that support the construction 
industry.  
Figure 2:1 Jobs Created from Infrastructure Investment Increase13 
 
 In terms of the strength of supplier power for labour, the power changed from 
high in 2006 to moderate-low in 2009.  During the recession, restaurants are able to find 
enough employees however, as the economy gains strength, then labour that is more 
skilled will leave the foodservice industry for higher paying jobs that will tilt the power 
back to labour supply strength.   
2.1.2.2 Food Supplies – Moderate Power 
As stated in Section 2.1.1.5, Access to Distribution Channels, there are several 
large food distribution firms in Canada.  Such as Sysco, Sunspun, Bridge Brand and 
                                                     
13 Canada’s Economic Action Plan. (June 5, 2009). Economic Climate. Retrieved from 
http://www.actionplan.gc.ca/eng/feature.asp?pageId=114 
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 Loblaws that supply both small independent restaurants and large restaurant chains.  
Many of the franchised fast food corporations either negotiate contracts with these 
distributors on a national or regional level to supply a large number of restaurants.  Other 
franchises negotiate with producers directly to make proprietary products, for example, 
frozen burgers that are exclusive to each chain, and then delivered via their own 
distribution channels or through companies like Sysco.  McDonald’s has been very 
successful as a low cost operation due to its size and buyer power to extract lower prices 
from its suppliers as well as vertically integrating a large part of their supply chain with 
their own storage and distribution network.  
Restaurants in the more remote rural areas of Canada have limited flexibility 
concerning their food deliveries as compared to the larger urban Canadian cities from 
food distributors like Sysco since their storage facilities are near the denser urban cities.  
Deliveries are made once or twice a week therefore stores must anticipate inventory 
levels for goods in advance just in case there are shortages at the warehouse or if the 
transport truck breaks down.  In addition, transport costs can be higher for smaller 
deliveries because transport/gas fees of up to $150 per delivery is charged if an order is 
under a minimum amount.  Smaller, low volume restaurants have cost disadvantages 
because they do not have the bargaining power to negotiate lower prices with food 
producers and distributors.   
The province is limited to three fluid milk processing companies:  Dairyland 
(Saputo), Parmalat, and Lucerne.  Therefore, restaurants like Dairy Queen have little 
bargaining power with Dairyland over the price of milk for their ice cream.  Other 
commodities like beef are also subject to market rates and prices vary.  Increasing costs 
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 of gas and electricity have increased the prices of both dairy and beef, which is passed 
along to restaurants and consumers.  Smaller restaurants are at a big disadvantage in 
comparison to large corporations like McDonald’s since they are able to enjoy lower 
costs spread over many stores.   
2.1.2.3 Beverage Supplies – High Power 
Pepsi and Coca-cola are very powerful beverage suppliers.  Fast food restaurants 
only have a choice between the two firms.  Some franchises deal exclusively with either 
Pepsi or Coca-cola on a national level, while other franchises allow the franchisee to 
contract either company for their restaurant.  Both Pepsi and Coca-cola are very 
competitive with one another and are constantly struggling to increase their market share.  
Both companies offer higher volume restaurants incentives and rebate to sell their 
products however; restaurants have little bargaining power on their pop and juice prices.   
2.1.2.4 Supplier Power – Conclusion 
Individual fast food restaurants have low control over many of their product 
inputs and are subject to the prices suppliers dictate.  A key to success for fast food 
restaurants is to keep costs low in order to have lower product prices.  It is advantageous 
to be a part of a larger franchise in order to capitalize on economies of scale and higher 
bargaining power to negotiate lower food/beverage prices.   
2.1.3 Buyer Power – High Power 
According to Porter, powerful buyers can make an industry less attractive and 
reduce profitability since they can demand price concessions for products and services.  If 
there is a relatively low concentration of buyers to suppliers, then buyers have greater 
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 power.  In addition, if the product supplied is not exclusive or proprietary then buyers 
have more power because they have more choices of which supplier to use.  The buying 
power of one individual customer at a fast food restaurant is quite low but the combined 
power of many consumers is high.  Low switching costs strengthen buyer power in fast 
food restaurants because if consumers are dissatisfied with one store they can easily 
avoid that store.  Although fast food consumers are not collectively purchasing and co-
ordinating their restaurant spending, many factors will influence where they eat.  
Convenience, speed, location, consistency and quality of food and service are all 
characteristics that buyers demand from all fast food outlets.  If a restaurant consistently 
fails to provide some services that are not on par with a buyer’s expectation, then the 
store will lose sales.   
The primary method that fast food restaurants use to mitigate buyer power is to 
differentiate their brand and create value for the consumer.  Fast food consumers are 
price sensitive; therefore, restaurants differentiate their menu items to appeal to different 
tastes, cravings and impulse purchases in hopes of creating brand loyalty to their 
‘favourite’ foods and treats.  Canadian consumers are also very time sensitive concerning 
their fast food purchases.  Drive-thru and quick in-store services are vital to appeal to 
customer needs.  Restaurants need to be flexible and adapt healthier menu options with  
lower trans fat foods are also important trends to monitor.   
The growing baby boomer demographic that will grow to thirty-four percent of 
the Canadian population by 2020 will control 50.7 percent of the nation’s total gross 
income (Euromonitor International, 2009).  A key factor is to appeal to the high buyer 
power of this age group since their influence will increase over the next ten years.  A&W 
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 has specifically catered to this target group and has successfully gained fourteen percent 
market share in 2008 as revealed in Table 2:2 in section 2.1.5 Competitive Rivalry below.      
2.1.3.1 Buyer Power – Conclusion 
The old adage ‘location, location, location’ is vital to the long-run success of any 
restaurant.  Consumers have high expectations with the type of food quality and service 
but more importantly, it must be fast and convenient.  Fast food restaurants have high 
competition and are subject to consumer trends, dietary health concerns and hard 
economic times, therefore they must work hard to attract and maintain diners to their 
stores. 
2.1.4 The Threat of Substitute Products – High Threat 
Porter’s model indicates if substitute products or services are readily accessible 
then firms in the industry will experience lower average profitability.  The degree to 
which the substitute can replace a product also accounts for the extent of its threat to the 
existing firms in the industry.   
2.1.4.1 High Number of Substitute Food Service and Products 
There are many firms that offer food products and services but they are in 
different foodservice segments.  Figure 1:5 QSR Segments lists several substitutes such 
as convenience stores, doughnut shops, coffee shops, ethnic, sandwich and bakeries.  
Their relative strengths within the foodservice industry are shown in the figure.  These 
stores offer quick meals and snacks; however, their menus offer items that differ from the 
average hamburger fast food restaurant.  Figure 1:4 Canadian Restaurant Trends lists 
other restaurants segments like fine, casual, retail and family dining.  These restaurants 
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 may offer similar food items as hamburger fast food restaurants but the service style 
would differ, for example, a sit down family restaurant may serve burger and fries, 
however it has a much longer wait time with a full dining experience versus picking up 
value meal at a fast food drive-thru.  A key reason why substitute restaurants are so 
successful is that they are able to differentiate into their varied niches.  One restaurant in 
particular, Tim Hortons, has been able to capitalize on many key market factors.   
2.1.4.2 Tim Hortons 
Although there are many available substitutes the quick service sector dominates 
with 60.1 percent of the dollars spent by consumers for the total Canadian foodservice 
industry.  Out of the quick service segment, the hamburger category makes up the largest 
portion with 28.4 percent.  Table 2:1 below represents a study by CREST or Consumer 
Reports on Eating Share Trends in conjunction with NPD Group.  It reveals the 
percentage share of dollars per restaurant in a twelve month period in 2008.  Tim Hortons 
is a significant substitute competitor with 27.4 percent share of dollars, and is the major 
driver of growth in the quick service segment of the industry (CREST, 2009).  Although 
they do not share any core menu items with QSR hamburger places, they are capturing a 
larger portion of the market each year.  More than fifty percent of Tim Horton’s revenue 
derives from coffee sales (Euromonitor, 2008).  Tim Horton’s popularity is due to their 
ability to optimize on several key success factors.  First, they have over 2800 
conveniently located stores all over Canada and many of them have a drive-thru.  Second, 
they are capturing the growing breakfast trend.  Third, they are capitalizing on the 
healthier eating trend with many of their menu items, such as muffins, soup, sandwich 
 41
 and wraps.  Fourth, their coffee is their major driver for success, consumers want good 
coffee with their breakfast or lunches.   
Table 2:1 Top Canadian QSR Operators % Share of Dollars, 12 me Nov'0814 
Top Canadian QSR Operators % Share of Dollars,  
12 me (months ending) November 2008 
 
Restaurant 
 
% Share of Dollars 
PCYA (% change vs. 
year ago) 
Substitute Restaurants 
Tim Hortons 27.4% 7% 
Subway 7.2% 7% 
QSR Independent 4.3% -11% 
KFC 3.9% 3% 
Starbucks 3.4% 12% 
Pizza Pizza 2.7% 5% 
Direct Competitor Restaurants 
McDonald’s 17.1% 5% 
A&W 4.3% 9% 
Wendy’s 3.7% 4% 
Dairy Queen 2.7% 3% 
Total QSR Dollars: $16,874,080,000 
PCYA = +5% 
2.1.4.3 Threat of Substitute Products – Conclusion 
The foodservice industry is very large and has many different types of products 
and services.  Hamburger QSR are losing market share and profitability to a significant 
substitute competitor, Tim Hortons.  In order to reduce the high threat, hamburger fast 
food restaurants must further differentiate and diversify by offering healthier menus, 
include breakfast options, and have better coffee.  Fast food chains must also continue to 
optimize existing strategies such as low cost operations, branding, and having convenient 
locations.   
                                                     
14 CREST. (March 2009). BC Operators Association Report. Retrieved June 10, 2009 from 
http://www.dairyqueen.net 
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 2.1.5 Competitive Rivalry – Very High 
When there exists a significant rivalry among firms in an industry, there is a 
reduction in the average industry profitability because competition drives down prices or 
increase costs when firms must match features of their products and services to their 
rivals.  Also, when the growth rate in an industry declines, then rivalry increases as firms 
compete heavily to maintain or take more market share from each other.  Another reason 
rivalry is high in an industry is if there is excess capacity, that is firms overproduce and 
therefore the excess supply results in lower prices and profits.  The rivalry in the fast food 
industry is very high because the market is mature and saturated with many competitors.   
Competition is further enhanced because of the economic recession and consumer 
spending has tightened.  In addition, the increasing threat of a strong substitute 
competitor, Tim Hortons, who has captured larger portions of the fast food market, is 
intensifying industry competition.  It is interesting to note from Table 2:1 above, that 
QSR independent restaurants have negative eleven percent growth from the previous 
year, this is likely due to lack of the ability to create value with brand enhancement and 
can not be competitive with higher product and distribution costs.  
2.1.5.1 Top Competitors in Canadian Hamburger Quick Service Restaurants 
Table 2:2 below, shows the CREST study results for the top Canadian hamburger 
QSR operator’s percent share of dollars for 2008.  The average percent change versus the 
same period a year ago (PCYA) for the hamburger quick service segment is three 
percent.  McDonald’s has the largest share at 55.9 percent with a growth of two percent.  
A&W has the second largest share at 12.2 percent with eight percent growth; Burger 
King also shares an eight percent growth increase from the previous year.  Dairy Queen 
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 has the fourth largest percent share of dollars at 9.3 percent; however, they are below the 
industry PCYA average with only one percent growth.  Currently, there are no Harvey’s 
restaurants in the same region as ABC Holdings, therefore only a brief discussion of their 
firm will be conducted.    
Table 2:2 Top Canadian QSR Burger Operators % Share of Dollars, 12 me Nov'0815 
Top Canadian QSR Burger Operators % Share of Dollars,  
12 me (months ending) November 2008 
 
Restaurant 
% Share of $ 
National 
PCYA 
National 
% Share of $ 
*Provincial 
PCYA 
*Provincial
Total QSR 
Traffic 
946,770,000 3% 139,746 0% 
McDonald’s 55.9% 2% 46.1% -3% 
A&W 12.2% 8% 21.4% 14% 
Wendy’s 10.8% 4% 10.8% -1% 
Dairy Queen 9.3% 1% 15.0% -10% 
Burger King 7.4% 8% 4.5% 0% 
Harvey’s 3.3% -4% 0.9% 0% 
PCYA (percent change vs. year ago) *Actual province kept anonymous 
2.1.5.2 McDonald’s Corp 
McDonald’s is the global leader in the burger fast food sector, with 31,377 outlets 
in 118 countries (Euromonitor International, 2009).  McDonald’s employs over 1.5 
million people that serve more than forty-seven million customers every day.  In Canada, 
there are over 1,400 McDonald’s.  The ongoing monthly franchise fee is four percent of 
gross sales in addition to rent that is a percentage of gross sales (McDonald’s, 2006).  
Their diverse geographic presence is one their strengths because it makes them less 
reliant on sales from the United States as compared to their competitors.  Their biggest 
strength is their large economies of scale that grants them high bargaining power with 
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 suppliers and control over its franchisees.   McDonald’s forward and backward integrated 
along its supply chain, it operates over forty distribution centers in the U.S. that supply 
meat, produce, baked goods, promotional products, training and development products, 
chemical and employee temp services (Euromonitor International, 2009).  In 2007, 
McDonald’s created a store within a store concept with the McCafe brand name that 
potentially added US$140,000 revenue per outlet.  McDonald’s strategy was to target 
coffee consumers who could no longer afford Starbucks but still wanted specialty coffee 
drinks.  In 2008, McDonald’s further strengthened its key breakfast sales by launching 
their breakfast burrito and premium drop coffee.    
2.1.5.3 A&W 
A&W has almost 700 stores in Canada that employed 21,000 people with $638.7 
million net sales in 2007.  A&W charges a 2.5 percent of net sales for franchise fees with 
an additional 2.5 percent for national advertising (A&W, 2009).  They are the second 
largest burger chain franchise and has slowly improving its market share by revamping 
its menu and redesigning its restaurants.  A&W also distributes its root beer in cans and 
bottles throughout Canada through an independent bottler licensed to manufacture and 
distribute the drinks to retail grocery stores.  A&W has chosen to position itself to target 
the baby boomer generation as well focussing on its drive-thru business for the breakfast 
and lunch market segments (Euromonitor International, 2008).     
2.1.5.4 Wendy’s /Arby’s Group 
Worldwide, there are over 6,600 Wendy’s stores and 3,750 Arby’s stores in 
twenty-two different countries with approximately 70,000 employees.  Franchise 
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 royalties are four percent of gross sales with four percent for advertising 
(Wendy’s/Arby’s Group, 2008).  In December, 1995, Wendy’s merged with Tim 
Horton’s and by October 2006 they spun off Tim Horton’s in order to strategically focus 
on burgers.  Wendy’s struggled financially with stagnant same-store sales due to heavy 
reliance on the U.S. market since ninety-five percent of their outlets are based in North 
America and could not out perform against McDonald’s and Burger King.  Wendy’s 
supply chain operations is partially vertically integrated with its own bakery subsidiary 
that supplies buns to its company and franchise operated restaurants.  In general, they do 
not sell food or supplies directly to their franchisees, but utilizes a distribution program 
that allows for volume purchasing arrangements with independent distributors.  
Approved suppliers then store and distribute the products to the various local restaurants 
(Euromonitor International, 2008).   
Wendy’s strategic objectives are to focus solely as a burger fast food chain with 
its ‘fresh, never frozen’ beef campaign that emphasizes freshly made products.  They are 
also attempting to diversify their menu.  Wendy’s tested a breakfast menu in 2007 with 
twenty to thirty percent of its restaurants and introduced Javaccino coffee and specialty 
drinks.  Wendy’s differentiation strategy is to emphasize healthy eating, old-fashioned 
values and traditional food (Euromonitor International, 2008).   
2.1.5.5 Burger King 
Burger King has more than 11,800 restaurants in seventy-five countries, with 300 
stores in Canada.  Franchise royalties are four percent with an additional four percent for 
advertising (Burger King Corp, 2009).  Burger King is the second largest burger fast food 
chain in the world with sixty-three percent of its outlets in the U.S. and plans to expand 
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 its international outlets to forty-five percent in the next five years.  Burger King’s 
strategy is not clear and attempts to focus on contradictory trends for premium, indulgent 
fast food at a value price with healthier products.  They are reliant on their scale 
economies and large advertising budget and essentially chasing McDonald’s for sales 
both within the U.S. and globally.  Burger King is targeting its ‘SuperFans’ or customers 
that eat nine or more times a month at burger fast food stores.  They implement a ‘barbell 
menu strategy’ that combines limited time product launches that include an indulgent, a 
value item and a value breakfast item on their menu (Euromonitor International, 2009).  
As part of their international branding plan, they have introduced premium and localised 
burgers that cater to different countries.  They have also introduced a premium coffee 
line, BK Joe (Euromonitor International, 2009). 
Burger King does not own its own distribution facilities and they require their 
franchisees to purchase from approved supplier lists in order to guarantee quality, price 
and consistency of products.  Burger King operates an independent purchasing 
cooperative, US. Restaurant Services Inc. (RSI), formed in 1992 to increase their 
purchasing power for food, equipment and promotional items as well the distribution 
manager for U.S. and Canadian franchisees (Euromonitor International, 2009).   
2.1.5.6 Harvey’s 
Harvey’s is an entirely Canadian franchise that started in 1959 in Richmond Hill, 
Ontario.  The franchise has approximately 300 locations in Canada, Harvey’s is owned 
and supported by Cara Operations Limited who also owns Swiss Chalet, Kelsey’s, 
Monatana’s and Milestone’s in Canada.  Harvey’s franchisees are able to utilize Cara’s 
scale economies with regards to marketing, product development, purchasing, real estate 
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 and IT.  Harvey’s royalty fees are an ongoing weekly five percent of gross sales, in 
addition to a four percent advertising fee and ongoing operating costs and rental fees 
(Harveys.ca, 2009).   
2.1.5.7 Regional/Provincial Competitors  
The small Northern Canadian city has a population of 50,000 and main economic 
drivers for the city are oil and gas, agriculture and forestry.  The city was enjoying a rich 
economic boom until the recent global recession and drop oil prices.  The burger fast 
food market saturated in the city, which has, four McDonald’s, one Burger King, two 
Wendy’s, two Dairy Queens, one A&W.  For other substitute fast food competitor there 
are two Tim Hortons, one Arby’s, four Subways, one Orange Julius, two KFC, one 
Extreme Pita, two Pita Pit, one Mr. Sub, two Taco Time, one Taco del Mar, and two 
Quiznos (Allpages.com, 2009).   
An interview on June 15, 2009 with a multi-unit franchise owner who wishes to 
remain anonymous gave his insight on the fast food industry in the province.  As an 
owner of several Wendy’s, Arby’s and Dairy Queens throughout the province he 
indicated that up until the recession he was experiencing growth between eight to 
fourteen percent among his stores, however during the recession sales have fallen flat and 
now has close to zero percent growth.  A combination of hard economic times with a 
saturated industry within the city has shrunk the overall profitability and increased the 
rivalry among all the restaurants.  His insight with the industry is inline with CREST’s 
survey for 2008 from Table 2:2.  On a provincial level, there was no growth in 2008 for 
consumer dollars spent on burger quick service restaurants, but DQ did badly with minus 
ten percent loss in growth from the previous year.  McDonald’s lost three percent and 
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 Wendy’s lost one percent while A&W did well by capturing all the lost sales from its 
rivals with a fourteen percent increase.   
Table 2:3 below is a summary of a CREST customer satisfaction survey for 
burger quick service restaurants in Western Canada in 2009.  The table identifies four 
major categories of key success factors, Service, Food, Environment and Price/Value.  
Each category can be further broken down.  Service entails factors such as pleasantness, 
fast/efficient, response, and speed of service.  Food includes factors like taste, quality, 
freshness and variety of menu items.  The Environment category encompasses items such 
as cleanliness, convenient location, and atmosphere.  The last category of Price/Value 
includes value, affordability and portion size.  A&W did very well and scored as top 
performers in every category while DQ did badly in every category except for food 
quality, taste and freshness.   
DQ has many weaknesses especially concerning Service pleasantness, speed and 
customer response to problems.  DQ scored very badly for value and affordability which 
is most likely the primary reason why the franchise has been losing market share.  
Another weak factor for DQ is the atmosphere, this is due to the resistance of franchisees 
unwilling to modernize their stores and update their service styles to the Grill & Chill, 
which would increase efficiency, speed and atmosphere.  A newly renovated store also 
changes the perception of the cleanliness of the store since outdated worn interiors and 
exteriors are refreshed.  DQ’s many weaknesses are opportunities for many changes to 
optimize on the key success factors that in turn satisfy customers to increase revenue.   
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 Table 2:3 Western Canada CREST Customer Satisfaction Survey, YE Nov 200816 
Western Canada CREST Customer Satisfaction Report, Year Ending Nov. 2008 
 Mean DQ A&W McDonald’s Wendy’s
Service 42 38 48 38 44 
Pleasant Service 43 40 49 40 42 
Fast/Efficient 43 34 49 40 48 
Accurate 57 57 63 53 56 
Valued Customer 31 28 36 25 33 
Service Speed (after order) 44 38 49 40 48 
Responds to Problems 34 29 39 32 36 
Length of Wait (before order) 42 39 49 37 43 
Food 46 47 50 37 50 
Temp of Food 47 48 51 39 50 
Food Taste 48 51 54 36 51 
Prepared as I like 46 46 51 38 49 
Quality Food 43 45 48 33 48 
Food was fresh 47 50 52 37 51 
Variety of Menu Items 44 44 44 39 52 
Environment 40 38 45 36 40 
Clean Restaurant 40 36 46 34 44 
Kid Friendly 41 41 42 39 41 
Convenient Location 52 52 57 52 48 
Atmosphere 30 27 34 27 34 
Clean Washroom 36 36 43 30 34 
Price/Value 38 31 42 40 41 
Good Value 37 28 41 40 40 
Affordable 37 26 40 44 39 
Portion Size 41 40 45 36 45 
Top Performers Bottom Performers 
 
2.1.5.8 Competitive Rivalry – Conclusion 
The burger fast food market is a very mature saturated industry with many strong 
competitors, which has become even more competitive with the recession.  McDonalds 
and other global chains that have larger economies of scale benefit with lower costs.  The 
chains that have been able to follow consumer trends have been able to take advantage of 
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 being early movers in the burger fast food industry.  Trends such as breakfast, premium 
coffee, value menu items and healthier menus are all items that many of the chains are 
starting to adopt.  One of the reasons why McDonald’s and A&W are first and second 
largest in market share is because they were able to capitalize as early movers for the 
breakfast trends.    
Dairy Queen has been losing market share over the years and it is especially 
difficult since DQ’s strategy has not been cost focussed in the past.  DQs direct 
competitor’s main source of business is burgers and food, while only thirty-six percent 
(Figure 1:9) of DQ’s revenue is derived from food versus sixty percent from treats.  DQ’s 
competitors are slowly encroaching and copying many of DQ’s treats, McDonald’s 
carries sundaes, cones and flurries, and Wendy’s new product are their Frosty Shakes.  
For the moment, McDonald’s is focussing on competing with Starbucks with their 
premium coffee line and McCafe expansion.   
2.1.6 Porter’s Sixth Force – Chance 
On occasion, other forces influence the structure and profitability of a firm that is 
attributed to chance.  Jay of ABC Holdings is over seventy years old and wishes to retire.  
Perhaps his stores’ poor performance is not entirely due to the recession, since Jay has 
not been directly managing them for many years.  Agency issues arise where managers 
may not have the owner’s best interest at heart when managing the store.  Vital decisions 
and the direction of the store operations may not be as efficient as it should be, therefore 
costs are higher or quality of food and service suffers.  Jay has also been putting off many 
store upgrades to modernize the store to keep them aligned with IDQ’s branding strategy.  
 51
 There is also the chance that Jay’s children may step up and take over the business or a 
buyer with a fair price will make an offer Jay will not refuse.     
2.1.7 Industry Attractiveness 
The overall effects of the Five Forces upon the fast food industry in Northern 
Canada do not create a very attractive industry.  Low barriers to entry, moderate to high 
power of suppliers, high buyer power, high number of substitute restaurants and very 
high rivalry, are not conducive for a favourable environment to compete.  Conditions are 
further exasperated with the economic recession and consumer’s decreased budgets for 
discretionary funds.  Figure 2:2 below is a summary of Porter’s Five Force Analysis. 
Figure 2:2  Porter's 5 Forces Summary 
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 2.1.8 Summary of Key Success Factors (KSF) 
Porter’s Five Forces analysis has revealed several key factors for success for a 
burger quick service restaurant, which are rated in Table 2:4 below.  They include 
economies of scale for supply and distribution networks in order to reach a minimum 
efficient scale (MES).  Costs are reduced since supplier power can be mitigated with the 
franchises higher buyer power.  Reputational capital is important to create consumer 
value for loyalty and repeat business.  Reputational capital, created through product 
differentiation creates ‘added value’ with price and quality of food and service.  
Convenience is also another key success factor, fast food restaurants need to be located in 
easily accessible, high traffic locations with a drive-thru.  Quick service is a necessity for 
the time conscious consumer especially during breakfast and lunch periods.  Other key 
success factors that cater to growing consumer trends and needs are breakfast, premium 
coffee and healthy menu choices.  
Table 2:4  Key Success Factors- Relative Level of Importance 
High Medium Low 
Convenience/Location Menu Variety Environment, clean 
Price Breakfast Pleasant Atmosphere 
Reputational Capital/value Coffee Target Baby Boomers 
Service, Fast/Efficient Healthy Menu  
Food Quality, Freshness   
Economies of Scale   
2.1.9 Competitive Analysis 
ABC Holding’s DQs regional competitors outlined earlier in Section 2.1.5.7 were 
listed as A&W, McDonald’s, Wendy’s and Burger King.  Based on the Five Force 
Analysis, the Crest customer survey in Table 2:3 and other sources, the key success 
factors are listed from most important at the top to less important at the bottom in Table 
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 2:5 below.  Each company is rated on a five-point scale for their strength with each 
factor.  A score of one means strong and five equals weak (ie. 1=weak; 5=strong).   
As seen from the table, A&W is strong with many KSF including value, service, 
food quality, breakfast, coffee, clean environment and targeting baby boomers.  A&W’s 
strengths are factors that accounts for their success and ability to capture a larger portion 
of the burger share dollars of fourteen percent change in November 2008 versus the 
previous year from Table 2:2.  DQ’s poor performance of negative ten percent share of 
burger dollars from November 2007 to November 2008 is inline with how weak DQ’s 
position for the majority of the KSF in comparison to its competitors.   
Table 2:5 Competitive Analysis  
KSF (Rating 1 to 5, where 
1 is worst, 5 is best) 
DQ A&W McDonald’s Wendy’s Burger 
King 
Convenience/Location 3 - O 2 5 4 1 
Price 1 - O 4 5 3 2 
Reputational 
Capital/value 
1 - O 5 4 2 3 
Service, fast/efficient 3 - O 5 2 4 1 
Food Quality, freshness 5 - T 4 1 3 2 
Economies of Scale 1 - O 4 5 3 2 
Menu Variety 4 - T 3 2 5 1 
Breakfast 1 - O 4 5 2 3 
Coffee 1 - O 4 5 2 3 
Healthy Menu Options 4 - T 1 3 5 2 
Environment, clean 2 - O 5 1 4 3 
Pleasant atmosphere 2 - O 5 1 4 3 
Target Baby Boomers 3 - O 5 2 4 1 
Total 31 51 41 45 27 
O = Opportunity T = Threat 
2.1.10 KSF – Threats 
The competitive analysis in Table 2:5 above revealed three main threats to DQ’s 
competitiveness.   
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  Food Quality, freshness – DQ rated high on the customer satisfaction survey for the 
quality of the food and its freshness.  It is important that DQ maintains its high 
standards and closely monitors their stock turn around so that food products do not 
remain in storage too long.   
 Menu Variety – For the moment, DQ is able to offer a wide menu variety because a 
large treat menu supplements its food products.  Franchisees have no control over its 
menu variety and must rely on headquarters to constantly innovate and introduce new 
menu items following market trends.  Competitors are continually expanding their ice 
cream dessert products.  For instance, Wendy has recently introduced their hand-spun 
Frosty® shakes.  Although Wendy’s does not have the variety of flavours that DQ 
offers, they are a threat because they are encroaching on DQ’s core competency of ice 
cream treats. 
 Healthy Menu Options – Franchisees have little control over their menus.  
Therefore, there is reliance upon IDQ to monitor health trends and adapt core menu 
changes when the need arises. 
2.1.11 KSF - Opportunities 
DQ is lacking in quite a few areas, which are the reasons why DQ has been losing 
market share to its competitors.   
 Convenience/location - The key success factor of convenience/location can be 
remedied if Jay or his kids decide to open a third DQ in a prime location.  The 
question is whether Jay really wants to take on the responsibility of a third store at 
this stage of his life, or if his children want to purchase the stores in addition to 
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 building a new one.  Perhaps as a long-run solution, a third location will be 
considered, but for the moment, the scope of this paper will only cover the two stores.   
 Price - In comparison to its competitors, IDQ has been very slow to adopt a value 
priced menu.  This mistake has been costly with the franchise’s lost market share.  
Table 2:6 below shows a tentative breakdown of how successful the Sweet Deals 
menu was in March and April of 2009.  Sweet Deals accounted from 9.26 percent to 
14.7 percent of store sales, which indicates that consumers are enjoying the flexibility 
and value with the menu that will add to DQs brand reputation and its ability to keep 
its customers coming back.  The long-run success of the Sweet Deals menu will 
require close monitoring of the COGs and IDQ’s ability to keep product costs in 
check.   
Table 2:6 Sweet Deals Sales March & April 200917 
Sweet Deals by Region – 2009 March & April Sales (Based on 50 polled stores) 
 Maritimes Ontario Sask. Alberta B.C. 
March 
Qty Sold 27.21% 28.89% -7.85% -7.47% -3.85% 
COGs -1.03% -2.51% -0.51% -1.35% -0.60% 
SD% Sales 13.64% 9.26% 13.42% 11.57% 11.15% 
April 
Qty Sold 8.96% -8.67% 22.83% 13.63% 6.95% 
COGs 0.83% 0.40% 0.69% -0.16% -0.24% 
SD% Sales 14.70% 9.15% 13.89% 12.42% 11.53% 
 
 Reputational Capital/value – DQ allocates a budget of five percent of monthly gross 
sales towards advertising.  The majority of this budget funds IDQ’s national 
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 advertising campaigns that include television and radio ads, as well as promotional 
material such as posters and coupons.  IDQ also requires each franchisee to market 
locally with advertising and sponsorships.  IDQ then reimburses each franchisee for 
the local advertising budgets.  Since Jay has stepped away from the day-to-day 
operations of the store, the managers have been advertising minimally within the 
community.  There is an opportunity for Jay’ managers to step up and be more 
involved with the community.  However, without the proper incentives for the 
managers to promote the store, nothing will change.   
 Service fast/efficient – Jay’ DQs are limited at their current capacities unless 
renovations and upgrades are done.  If the stores are upgraded to the Grill & Chill 
design, then it improves service efficiency.  There is also an opportunity to revamp 
the drive-thru system to be more efficient if the stores are renovated. 
 Economies of Scale - Jay has limited control over some of the key success factors 
such as the distribution network since his two stores are the only DQs in the region, 
Saputo is the only dairy supplier he can use for his ice cream and therefore is subject 
to their prices.  In the past, Sysco used to be the main distributor for DQs in the 
province; however, they dropped the contract because as a whole, the volume was too 
low for them to keep DQ as a client.  After quick negotiations with IDQ, Sunspun 
took over the provincial DQ account however, the smaller company was more 
expensive and delivery was sporadic because their trucks broke down or they would 
have issues with their distribution center with how they packed the products in the 
truck since goods were often damaged.  Currently, Bridge Brand a Gordon Food 
Service company is distributing DQ products and they are providing better prices and 
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 services in comparison to Sunspun.  Jay also has little control over his cost of goods 
(COGs) from IDQ since he is obligated to purchase DQ products, therefore he must 
rely on IDQs ability to negotiate with suppliers for better prices.   
 Breakfast - Jay’s ability to offer breakfast at his DQs is somewhat limited because 
the franchise has not adopted the national breakfast menu.  He maybe able to offer 
limited items and advertise locally to promote breakfast, however without a national 
marketing campaign it would be more difficult for consumers to associate DQ with 
breakfast.   
 Coffee - The issue of coffee as a KSF can be temporarily remedied on a local level 
because the coffee at Jay’s stores is a low/mid grade coffee sourced from an 
independent distributor.  Jay can easily tell his manager to source a more premium 
coffee and market it on a local level, however IDQ would have to adopt a national 
coffee program and develop a premium coffee line of products that would hopefully 
integrate the treat aspects of DQ in order to differentiate it from competitors.   
 Clean Environment – Both of Jay’ DQs are showing their age, one was renovated in 
1998 and another built in 2001.  The walls, fixtures, tables, chairs and equipment are 
no longer in pristine condition, therefore the restaurants may not be perceived as 
‘clean’ as they could be.  Re-painting the building only attributes to a cosmetic 
change therefore there is further incentive for Jay to upgrade his restaurants to the 
Grill & Chill concepts. 
 Pleasant Atmosphere - There are also additional opportunities to improve DQ’s 
service and brand image if Jay either modernizes or converts his stores to the Grill & 
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 Chill concept.  It would be in his best interest to improve the old dated atmosphere of 
his stores to improve customer satisfaction and to create ‘added value’ with the self-
serve pop stations and expedited seated quick service style format.   
 Target Baby Boomers – IDQ’s target demographic age groups are adults between 
eighteen to forty-nine years old and children between two to eleven years old. (AM. 
D.Q. Corp., 2009).  IDQ is not taking advantage of the growing baby boomer 
population; therefore, the opportunity to capitalize on this key success factor is 
missed.  Jay’ ability to attract the baby boomer population is restricted without a 
national marketing campaign to support him.   
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 2.2 Alternatives 
1) The first alternative is for Jay to arrange leveraged buyouts for his stores with 
his children, Kim and Ross.  The additional costs to upgrade the stores will 
have to be taken into account as part of the purchase price as well as the 
opportunity costs for when the stores are closed for business during the 
upgrade.  Another condition would be if Kim wishes to implement a breakfast 
strategy, then would enough customers adopt DQ as part of their breakfast 
routine to offset the costs for an additional early morning shift and the local 
regional marketing to promote it.  If the return on investment does not seem 
viable with the costs associated with the sale and if the organization’s internal 
capabilities are not inline with the strategy, then it may be better to sell the 
stores instead. 
2) A second alternative would be for Jay to sell both stores to an independent 
third party. 
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 3: Internal Analysis – Diamond-E Framework 
The Diamond-E model is a strategic analysis tool that helps determine the 
viability of a strategy with its relationship with critical structural variables.  It analyses 
whether a company’s strategy is consistent or aligned with the environment, and the 
internal capabilities of a company with its resources, organization and management 
preferences (Crossan et al, 2005).  Section 2: External analysis outlined the 
environmental conditions that Jay’s Dairy Queens operate.  The following sections will 
discuss the internal capabilities of ABC Holdings and if it aligns with the proposed 
alternative strategies.   
3.1 Management Preferences 
Jay purchased his first small DQ in 1980; by 1987, he demolished the little store 
and built a larger 3,300 square foot stand-alone DQ Brazier store.  A few years later, a 
drive-thru was added onto the building that resulted in a significant increase in sales.  In 
1998, a second 3,000 square foot DQ Brazier was built.  Both stores performed 
remarkably well over the years despite the long cold Northern Canadian winters and 
seasonal ice cream treat sales.   
3.1.1 Preferences 
After almost thirty years of operating his DQs, Jay is past the age of retirement 
and wishes his children would step up and take over responsibility of his stores.  Jay 
prefers that his legacy with the stores be passed onto his children but is somewhat 
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 apprehensive.  His son wants to take over one of the stores; however, he does not want to 
purchase it, he expects it to be given to him.  His daughter, Kim has moved away from 
the city and does not want to move back unless the leveraged buyout is favourable for 
her.  
3.1.2 Decision Criteria 
 Alternative two maybe more favourable for Jay since it will involve fewer family 
disputes and he would be guaranteed to receive a fair price for his stores and therefore 
better able to enjoy his retirement.  Ultimately, the decision is up to Jay and what he feels 
is best for the family.  There are also several personal reasons for why Kim is unwilling 
to move back to the city and operate the DQ.   
3.1.3 Management Team 
It has been difficult for Jay to find reliable managers over the years.  Ideally two 
managers each are needed for each store, however the labour shortages in combination 
with the cold winters has made it difficult to attract reliable people.  Since DQ is open 
from ten am to eleven pm everyday and is only closed during Christmas and New Years, 
each manager works at minimum six days per week, with short breaks that result in more 
than sixty-five hour work weeks.  Vacations are also very difficult to plan since store 
operations are highly dependent on the manager.   
3.1.4 Leadership 
One other contingent before Kim would consider purchasing one of the DQs 
would be to find two trustworthy managers that would be willing to run the stores since 
she does not want to micro-manage the store on a daily basis.  Another condition is for 
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 the management team to take a more active role to market and promote the store within 
the community.   
3.1.5 Gaps with Management Preferences 
There is a generational gap between Jay and his adult children with their 
perception of how to manage the stores.  Jay has successfully operated his stores for 
almost thirty years and micro-manages every detail and decision.  Disputes have arisen 
over the years because he expects his children to work thirteen hours a day, six days a 
week.  Even on their days off, he expects them to go to work.  Jay’s lack of trust is also 
problematic because it is the main reason why he micro-manages the stores.  The lack of 
transparency with the financials has hindered his managers from taking any initiatives to 
improve the stores’ performance and to cut costs.  Jay perceives that if his kids do not 
operate the stores the same way he has over the past thirty years, then they will fail, 
hence his apprehension to sell the stores his adult children.    
3.1.6 Suggested Gap Bridging Solution 
If Jay decides to allow his children to purchase the stores, then he must be willing 
to release control entirely.  A problem arises with this solution because Jay will 
ultimately be responsible for the leveraged buyout if either of his children fail to pay the 
bank and the franchise.  As a result, Jay will use this power to influence key decisions 
with the stores, which will lead to more family disputes.  The ultimate solution that 
would minimize family conflict is to consider Alternative 2 and sell the business to a 
third party.  
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 3.2 Organization 
3.2.1 Structure 
The organizational structure within the DQ is informal with the owners as the 
central authority figures.   There is a low degree of departmentalization and is monitored 
by one manager for each store who overseas all sections of the store.  Jay’s son manages 
the second DQ and up until recently, his daughter had managed the first store for quite a 
few years before moving on.  The managers are responsible for every aspect of the store, 
from opening to closing.  All human resource functions such as hiring/firing, scheduling, 
training, and payroll as well as operations and inventory management are some of the 
manager’s duties.  Jay must approve all major decisions regarding both stores before the 
managers can act upon them.    
The routine responsibilities are spread throughout the supervisors and senior staff 
members.  The store is organized into several main departments:  the kitchen, drive-thru, 
cake department and the front counter area.  The majority of the staff is cross-trained in 
several areas of the store in order to support ‘busy’ times in different areas.  The staff at 
the DQ consists of a main core of senior full-time staff members, some who have been 
with the company for over twenty years.  The DQ is also supported by a high turnover of 
part-time seasonal staff.  The main priority for all of the staff is to provide quality but fast 
service to all customers, followed by their regular duties to maintain and operate the 
store.   
3.2.2 Systems 
The location of the DQs is in Northern Canada where the long cold snowy winters 
can last up to seven to eight months.  DQ is known for its ice milk treats so the 
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 seasonality of its ‘busy’ season is dependent on the short summers for its main treat sales.  
Figure 3:1 below shows a summary from ABC Holdings sales records for the number of 
transactions per month for one of the DQs in 2007.  The number of customers served per 
month ranges from a low of 8300 customers in December to 24,000 customers in June 
and July.  During the busiest periods, the store can serve up to 120 customers per hour.  
DQ has built a long-standing reputation for its fast quality service because of its ability to 
service high volumes of customers during the summer months.  As seen from the graph, 
on average forty-eight percent of the consumers are served through the drive-thru.  The 
store is more than capable of serving the ‘busy’ summer capacity throughout the entire 
year.  Perhaps an upgrade to the more food-centric Grill & Chill will provide additional 
food sales throughout the year and will mitigate the seasonal sales. 
Figure 3:1 DQ #1 2007 Customer Tally 
Dairy Queen #1 2007 Customer Tally
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 3.2.3 Organizational Culture 
If the DQs are upgraded to the Grill & Chill concept, then the staff should easily 
adapt to the new service style.  Upgrades require no changes to the drive-thru service 
style; however, the two main changes apply to the in-store service style.  First, employees 
no longer need to fill pop orders because they supply empty cups to customers who in 
turn fill their own pop before they sit down.  Second, employees expedite food to the 
table, which does not take too much effort.  This service style is more efficient and 
creates a positive value-added experience for customers.  
It will be more problematic if Kim wishes to implement breakfast at DQ.  It 
would involve creating a third shift and extra expenses with opening early with no 
guarantee of sales.  Staffing costs alone is estimated to be around $4,800 per month with 
a supervisor and two employees.  According to correspondence with Dave Acton, Area 
Vice President of Dairy Queen Canada on June 29, 2009, there are less than ten stores in 
Canada that are currently carrying a breakfast menu, at one point, there were over one 
hundred stores with breakfast but it was proven not to be a profitable option.  The 
addition of a third shift, extra equipment and the stress/strain on utilities and expenses do 
not justify the increase in sales.  Breakfast sales are very value orientated with very slim 
profit margins.  Mr. Acton also mentioned that breakfast sales were statistically 
insignificant which accounted for only 0.11 percent of last years sales for those stores 
that sell breakfast.  It looks like it is risky to attempt breakfast sales for Jay’s DQs 
especially since ninety percent of the DQs in Canada have failed to succeed with it.   
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 3.2.4 Gaps with Organization 
The core staff and management are quite experienced and are set in their ways.  It 
would not be too difficult to adopt the serving style of a Grill & Chill.  However, there 
will be a lot of resistance if Kim wishes to open early for breakfast.  The majority of the 
full-time staff already work several double-shifts per week and very few would want to 
wake up for an early shift, especially if they also work evening shifts.  Perhaps over time, 
it is possible to hire enough people for the extra shift; however, two seasoned staff would 
need to transfer to the early shift in order to ensure the smooth operation of the store.  
This would have been very difficult when the province was experiencing a severe labour 
shortage, but it is possible to in the present conditions with the right incentives.  As stated 
in the section above, staffing costs are estimated at $4,800/month and it is unlikely that 
breakfast sales would offset the expenses.  Conditions are not favourable for alternative 
one since according to Mr. Acton, it will not be a profitable venture, therefore Kim 
should reconsider her intent to serve breakfast at DQ.   
 
3.3 Resources 
3.3.1   Human Resources 
Prior to the recession, it was difficult to find enough employees for all positions in 
both stores.  The number of staff ranges from thirty full and part-time employees for each 
store during the winter, up to fifty during the summer.  During the labour shortage in 
2006 and 2007, employment agencies were utilized to find twenty-one employees from 
Eastern Canada and six international employees from Mexico and the Philippines.  In 
addition, ABC Holdings purchased three houses to rent to these employees as well as 
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 provide transportation daily to and from work.  Jay was fortunate at this time to find a 
manager to run one of the stores, enabling his daughter to step away from the store to 
pursue her education.  For the moment, the staffing situation at both DQs is under control 
however, a long-term solution is needed in light of Jay’s desire to retire.   
Dairy Queen Canada (DQC) has specific guidelines if a franchisee wishes to 
transfer ownership or change control of the daily operations of the store to immediate 
family members or to store managers.  A transfer involves a lease, instalment sale, 
contract for deed, management agreement, or sale of stock (Champagne, 2007).  No 
transfer fee is charged for transfers to immediate family members however, the seller 
must guarantee the financial obligations of the buyer for a minimum of three years.  In 
addition, the franchise has the right to refuse any transfers if the buyer does not pass a 
background and credit check, readiness assessment, break-even point projection, personal 
interview, or management training. Transfer applicants must meet three financial 
requirements, they must have: 1) a net worth greater than fifty percent of the purchase 
price or $75,000, 2) liquid assets greater than twenty percent of the purchase price or 
$30,000 and 3) operating capital of $25,000 or thirty-three percent of fixed and semi-
variable expenses (Champagne, 2007).  None of Jay’s children qualifies for the financial 
requirements therefore Jay has to weigh the risk of guaranteeing his children’s transfer 
versus selling the stores outright.   
3.3.2 Operational Resources 
The remote location of the city prevents the ability for Jay’s DQs to join other 
franchisees in order to form conglomerates, which collectively outsource replacement 
suppliers at a lower cost in comparison to the IDQ suppliers.  As a result, the products are 
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 at a slightly higher price in comparison to the DQs in the closest large city that is almost 
four hundred kilometres away.  Sales for both DQs have consistently surpassed both 
regional, or all DQs in the Northwestern part of Canada and national or all DQs in 
Canada over the years.  Figure 3:2 below is a comparison of both ABC Holding’s DQs 
for 2008, which shows that both stores steadily double the average sales of the majority 
of DQs in the nation.  This indicates that the city can easily support a third DQ if Jay or 
his children choose to.  
Figure 3:2 Monthly Total Sales 2008 vs. Average Regional & National Sales18 
 
The five-year total sales for both DQs are portrayed in Figure 3:3 below indicate 
that growth has been nominal over the last few years.  DQ#1 had a 0.45 percent increase 
in sales from 2007 to 2008 while DQ#2 had a 3.68 percent growth over the same period.  
Sales are expected to be similar or slightly less than the 2008 numbers even with the 
current recession.  The sales at DQ#2 are more stable than DQ#1 because their 
                                                     
18 AM. D.Q. Corp. (2009). My Stores: Monthly Total Sales vs. Average Regional & National Sales. 
Retrieved June 16, 2009 from 
https://www.dairyqueen.net/en/Franchisee/MyStores/Pages/MyStoreReports.aspx?view=msales 
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 dependence on the seasonal ice cream sales is lessened since they have stronger food 
sales throughout the year.   
Figure 3:3 Five Year Total Sales Comparison19 
 
The 2008 sales by categories are exhibited in Figure 3:4 below.  The red line is 
soft serve sales and the purple line is food sales.  DQ#1 has much stronger ice cream 
sales in the summer but their food sales are noticeably lower than DQ#2 throughout the 
year.  This indicates that an upgrade to the more food-centric concept of a Grill & Chill 
would place both restaurants in a much stronger position for food sales while still 
maintaining their soft serve sales.   
3.3.3 Financial Resources 
3.3.3.1 Grill & Chill Remodel Costs 
IDQ offers franchisees three choices of remodel costs, a base-level remodel that is 
estimated to be around $223,285, a mid-level remodel at $312,766 and a full-level 
remodel at $447,706 (AM. D.Q. Corp., 2009).   
                                                     
19 AM. D.Q. Corp. (2009). My Stores: 5 Year Sales Comparison. Retrieved June 16, 2009 from 
https://www.dairyqueen.net/en/Franchisee/MyStores/Pages/MyStoreReports.aspx?view=5yrsales 
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 Figure 3:4  2008 Sales by Category20 
 
Table 3:1 below shows the building and equipment cost breakdown for the full-
level remodel.  A typical remodel takes approximately four to seven weeks depending on 
the extent of the remodel and construction progress.  It is possible during the remodel that 
the store does not need to be entirely shut down, as the drive-thru can remain open during 
the interior construction.   An estimate is that the store only needs to be closed for two 
weeks.  Another assumption is that if the stores are going to be upgraded to the Grill & 
Chill concept, and then preference will be for a full-level remodel since it is undesirable 
to have further construction at a later date for further upgrades.   
Table 3:1 Grill & Chill Remodel Costs21 
Grill & Chill Remodel Costs 
Area Building Cost Equipment Cost 
Exterior Remodel $179,107 $49,346 
Interior Remodel $168,141 $51,112 
Total $347,248 $100,458 
Grand Total $447,706 
 
                                                     
20 AM. D.Q. Corp. (2009). My Stores: Sales Categories and Product Usage. Retreived June 16, 2009 from 
https://www.dairyqueen.net/en/Franchisee/MyStores/Pages/MyStoreReports.aspx?view=salesprodcat 
21 AM. D.Q. Corp. (June 4, 2009). Grill & Chill Remodel Costs. Retreived June 16, 2009 from 
https://www.dairyqueen.net/en/Franchisee/Facility/Pages/Remodel.aspx 
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 After the launch of the newly remodelled DQ Grill & Chill, an initial increase in 
sales for the first year is expected with a slight drop-off after the launch promotion 
period.  The intent is for sales to remain at a higher level as compared to sales before the 
remodel.  A cost analysis based on a modest ten percent return on investment with a 
target to re-cover the initial cost of investment of $447,706 in addition to the opportunity 
cost of lost sales during the shutdown for the remodel of $130,000 within five years after 
the remodel.  A sensitivity analysis, Figure 3:5 below, was conducted to outline the best 
to worst case scenarios for the incremental sales increases that can be expected.  
Although the aim is for the more food-centric Grill & Chill to increase food sales, the ice 
cream sales will also increase as well since the remodelled restaurant will draw in more 
customers.   
In the most-likely scenario, the discounted payback period was just over five 
years, which meets the five year goal to re-coup the remodel costs.  In the worst-case 
scenario, it will take over nine years to payback the $577,706 at a discounted rate.  Once 
the decision is made to convert the DQ Brazier to a Grill & Chill then there is no turning 
back, there is a risk that it will not be successful.  However, in light of the stagnating 
sales, seasonal dependency, and increasing competition from rivals it would be in the best 
interest to convert both DQs.  In the best-case scenario, there is a potential for the 
investment costs to be regained in just over two years.  Also, modernizing the DQ, 
addresses several key success factors such as improving convenience, increased 
perception of value of service, and brand reputation.  Other key success factors such as 
distribution network and healthy menu options are mainly in the control of the franchise, 
which DQ Canada will continue to reduce cost of goods.   
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 Figure 3:5  Grill & Chill Upgrade - Sensitivity Analysis 
 
3.3.3.2 Action Plan for Grill & Chill Remodel 
IDQ makes it easy for franchisees to upgrade or remodel their stores.  Everything 
is planned out and provided for the store owners.  Architectural plans, interior and 
exterior design plans, a construction schedule and a marketing plan for the roll-out of the 
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 new restaurant.  Table 3:2 below is an abbreviated outline of a remodel schedule for a 
full-level Grill & Chill construction.   
Table 3:2  DQ Grill & Chill Full-level Remodel Construction Schedule22 
DQ Grill & Chill Full-level Remodel Construction Schedule 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Preconstruction:  Contracts signed, DQ/City Plans approved, Building Permit, Materials ordered 
Phase 1: Exterior 
Demolition/site work         
Chimney: Frame, stonework         
Roofing         
Exterior Finishes, lights         
Paint Exterior         
Awnings         
Equipment Delivery         
Exterior Signage         
Phase 2: Dining Room 
Demolish Dining & 
Restroom 
        
Dining Room         
Paint/replace ceiling grid         
Floor tile         
Paint, Interior Awnings         
Equipment delivery/install         
Phase 3: Service Area 
Demolish Service Area         
Frame Service Area         
Electrical, wall tile         
Front Counter         
Equipment Delivery/install         
Pop Machine Install         
Cash Register Install         
Menu board, signage         
Phase 4: Project Closure 
Professional Clean         
City & Health Inspection         
Punch List         
Turnover to Operators         
3.3.3.3 Valuation of ABC Holdings 
The income capitalization approach is a common method of real estate valuation.  
The analysis values income producing properties based on the relationship between the 
                                                     
22 AM. D.Q. Corp. (2009). Construction Time Lines All Levels. Retrieved June 16, 2009 from 
https://www.dairyqueen.net/en/Franchisee/Facility/Pages/Remodel.aspx 
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 capitalization rate with the net income the property produces.  An estimate of a property’s 
market value is based on the present value of future income from the property (Gaines et 
al, 1996).   Appendix A has the assumptions and calculations for the land and property 
assessment.  For confidentiality purposes, the breakdown of the final total values of the 
DQs, the land and the income stream of the lease are modified from actual values.   
3.3.4 Gaps with Resources 
Human resources are weak in terms of upper management for the DQ.  The 
employees, supervisors and managers are complacent and have not been encouraged to 
take any initiatives for the company because of the heavy reliance on Jay to make all the 
key decisions for the stores.  Jay struggled for almost seven years before he was able to 
find another reliable manager to help alleviate some of the stress at the stores.  If Kim 
were to purchase one of the stores, she would prioritize the hiring of at least two reliable 
managers to operate the store.  She does not want to micro-manage the store even though 
her parents expect her to.  Since Jay will be financially accountable for the leveraged 
buyouts, he will exert his control and pressure his children to operate the stores as he sees 
fit.  Kim needs to judge if the risks with personal conflicts in combination with the 
financial risks outweigh the rewards of owning a DQ.   
The operational resources are moderately strong for both of the DQs in 
comparison to regional and national DQs.  Although growth has levelled off in the past 
few years, the relatively constant and predictable revenues are attractive.  The differences 
with the food and treat sale fluctuations between the two stores make it apparent that it is 
ideal for DQ to increase their food sales to mitigate the seasonality treat sales.  This 
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 favours the first alternative to upgrade the stores to the Grill & Chill food-centric 
concepts.   
 The financial resources are not favourable for Kim to purchase one of the DQs 
and upgrade the store immediately.  In essence, the cost of upgrading plus the opportunity 
costs, adds almost $600,000 to the purchase price of the DQ.   The upgrade costs would 
be absorbed better several years after the purchase of the DQ in order for the bulk of the 
purchase debt is paid down.  Figure 3:6 below is a summary of the Diamond-E 
Framework strategic analysis for ABC Holdings. 
Figure 3:6  Diamond-E Framework for ABC Holdings 
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 4: Recommendations 
The recommendation for ABC Holdings is alternative two; sell both stores to an 
independent third party.  The first alternative is not viable after the internal analysis of the 
company using the Diamond-E Framework.  The motivations and expectations for Jay 
and his children greatly differ and they may not be able to resolve the differences and 
find a common ground concerning the future of the stores.  Ultimately, one major factor 
is the fact that neither of Jay’s children can afford to purchase the stores without 
burdening their father with the risk of leveraging the buyouts.   
Conditions are also not favourable for Kim to buy one of the DQs since several of 
the KSF are dependant on IDQ.  Kim has little power to influence factors such as 
distribution network and price due to high product costs.  In addition, it is unlikely 
breakfast is an option because of the high failure rate.  A premium coffee line is also 
unlikely to occur without the support of IDQ to rollout a marketing campaign.  Kim also 
has personal wishes to avoid moving back to the city unless all her other options are not 
viable.   
The external conditions are not favourable for restaurants because the fast food 
industry is a saturated mature market where firms in the industry compete heavily for 
market share.  Competition is even fiercer due to the recession and consumers have 
smaller discretionary budgets.  Porter’s Five Forces analysis revealed that it is relatively 
easy for chained restaurants like Harvey’s to enter the market because of their brand 
recognition, access to distribution channels and low switching costs for consumers.  It is 
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 also easy for the current chains to increase the number of stores in the city if they felt the 
market could support it.  The analysis also revealed that one very strong substitute rival, 
Tim Horton’s is dominating the Canadian fast food market with their strong breakfast and 
coffee sales.   
DQ has been losing market share for several reasons.  Firstly, the DQ brand is not 
associated with food/burgers therefore DQ sales are heavily reliant on seasonal ice cream 
sales.  Second, DQ has always been on the high-end of the price scale, which is slowly 
being addressed by the franchise with the Sweet Deals value menu, and the 
implementation of programs to reduce product costs for Canadian DQs.  Third, DQ has 
not been able to capture any of the breakfast or coffee market.  This part of the 
recommendations may not be plausible because ninety out of the one hundred DQs in 
Canada failed to implement a profitable breakfast program.  Lastly, many DQ operators, 
like Jay have been reluctant to take the risk and expense to upgrade their restaurants, 
which addresses many key success factor opportunities, such as value, service, and brand 
reputation.   
4.1 Sub-Recommendations 
The internal capabilities of both Jay’s DQs are very strong with its operational 
resources even though sales have flattened; they still consistently outperform the regional 
and national sales averages.  The organization of the DQs is a little top heavy where all 
key decisions are reliant upon Jay, and it is recommended that an incentive program to tie 
the manager’s salary and bonus with the store’s performance.  Therefore, the manager 
would be motivated to look after the best interests of the store in lieu of relying on Jay.  
Another recommendation that can easily be adopted at a local level is to source a higher 
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 quality coffee until IDQ decides to adopt a national coffee program.  It is doubtful that 
since ninety DQs failed with the breakfast trial runs; then it is unlikely that IDQ will plan 
to implement a coffee program.       
It is highly recommended that Jay upgrade his stores to Grill & Chills, if he 
decides not to sell them.  It is unlikely that he would agree to the expense of the upgrade 
since it would tie-up many of his resources during a time when he is ready to retire.  If he 
does sell the business, then it suggested that for the long-run success of the restaurant, 
then the new owner should upgrade the building.  By doing so, it addresses several key 
success factor opportunities in addition to somewhat mitigating the seasonal ice cream 
sales with a more food-centric restaurant.   
One final solution to Jay’s problems would be for him to keep the land but sell the 
building and franchise.  This way, he will still receive a steady monthly income stream 
from the lease and it will lesson the capital demand requirements for his children to buy 
the restaurants.  Perhaps his children can use the costs of upgrading the stores to a Grill & 
Chill to be a part of the negotiation for the price of the final value of the building.  
Ultimately, nothing will change with ABC Holdings unless Jay decides he wants to sell 
the business.  His management preference style is the overriding key to any decisions 
made regarding the company.   
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